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Abstract
This research identifies the origins of the early demographic transition
in France, before the French Revolution and more than a century before
the rest of Europe. We provide strong empirical evidence suggesting
that secularization accounts for the bulk of the decline in fertility and
document large, significant, and robust results across specifications,
datasets, and estimation methods. We draw on a novel individual-level
historical dataset crowdsourced from publicly available genealogies to
establish a causal interpretation. This dataset allows to control for
time-varying unobservables, to study the effect of secularization before
and after demographic change, and to exploit the choice of migrants in
the aftermath of the decline in religiosity. Finally, we discuss the roots of
the rapid and early process of secularization and suggest that the strength
of the Counter Reformation following the demise of Protestantism in
France played an important part. Our findings demonstrate that cultural
change and the transition to modernity and away from tradition can
shape development.
JEL codes: N33, O10, Z12
Keywords: fertility, modernization, development, secularization
God blessed Noah and his sons and said to them, “Be fertile, increase in
number, and fill the earth” —Genesis 9:1
And the race of man cannot, by any efforts of reason, escape from it
—Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798)
1 Introduction
Over the past three hundred years, the transition from stagnation to growth has
triggered dramatic upheavals with enduring consequences. As many regions of the
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world experienced unprecedented growth, an evolution towards modernity and away
from tradition also took place. Most accounts place industrialization and development
first, followed by unwavering modernization in social norms, political organization, and
demographic behaviors. However, the sequencing is intricate because most of these
changes took place simultaneously.
This paper advances the hypothesis and demonstrate that secularization, not de-
velopment, brought about the demographic transition in France: modernization ma-
terialized before industrialization. The demographic transition plays a major part
in the process of development, the transition from a regime of high fertility and low
growth to a regime of low fertility and high growth.1 Yet, while the rest of Europe
experienced a sustained decline in the rate of fertility at the very earliest in 1870’s,
and in 1892 for England and Wales (Coale and Watkins, 1986), the transition started
in France before the French Revolution. There is some uncertainty on the timing due
to the lack of available data before the Revolution, but the onset of the decline in
fertility has been estimated to occur between 1755 and 1776 (Blanc, 2019; Cummins,
2012).
Why the demographic transition started first in France, more than a century before
the rest of the world, has been a long standing puzzle.2 In many ways, France was
a developing country in the eighteenth century. In 1750, literacy in France was half
that of England and Wales. France attained the GDP per capita of 1750 England
and Wales, the cradle of the Industrial Revolution, in the aftermath of World War I,
and it took France more than a century to achieve the rate of urbanization of 1750
England: only in 1950 did urban population outnumbered rural population.
In the mid-eighteenth France underwent, also before any other country, a major and
rapid process of secularization and decline in religiosity (Chartier, 1991; Van Kley,
1996). Historical and anecdotal evidence suggests that a rapid and sharp weakening
of Roman Catholic Christian values affected all layers of society as soon as in the
1740’s and 1750’s. According to Tackett (1986), “a spirit of irreligion was sweeping
over the kingdom (...) in a veritable flood ” (p. 252). Desacralization, characterized
by Weber (1904/1905) as “disenchantment”, Entzauberung, contributed to a broader
process of modernization and move away from the weigh of tradition, documented by
McCloskey (2006, 2010, 2016) and Mokyr (2016).
We establish that the spread of modern norms of limited fertility in eighteenth
century France was an outcome of secularization. We do so using a variety of empir-
ical methods, novel historical measures to capture secularization, as well as a novel
individual-level dataset that allows to control for unobservables and to study fertility
1“We all agree that the escape from the Malthusian trap is the most important event in world history”
(McCloskey, 2010, Chapter 23).
2See Coale and Watkins (1986); Cummins (2012); Henry (1972a,b, 1978); Henry and Houdaille (1973);
Knodel and van de Walle (1979); Murphy (2015); Weir (1994); Wrigley (1985a,b), among others.
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decisions in the eighteenth century (in a time without administrative data), before
and after the transition.
In our analysis, we exploit variation in the extent of the decline in religiosity by
looking at the effect of religiosity in the late eighteenth century conditional on pre-
secularization religiosity proxies. Our main independent variable is Religiosity (late
18th c.) and is measured at the département and at the district levels. This is the
outcome of the process of secularization that took place in the 1750’s. We use the
share of refractory clergy (nonjurors) in 1791, before the policies of dechristianization
and major anti-Church events of the French Revolution. The 1790 Civil Constitution
of the Clergy required clergymen to take an oath of allegiance to the State. The oath
had to be taken “on a Sunday at the conclusion of the mass” (Decree on the clerical
oath, 1790), and Franck and Johnson (2016); Squicciarini (2017); Tackett (1986) argue
that it reflected the religiosity of the population at the start of the French Revolution.
In order to capture the decline in religiosity and not preexisting differences, we con-
trol for pre-secularization religiosity measures in most of our regressions. Importantly,
in France, as opposed to the rest of the world, secularization was a rural phenomenon.
Since historical times, rural areas have placed more value on tradition and less on tech-
nological change and human capital accumulation. We therefore expect our estimates
throughout the paper to be downwards biased, towards zero.
We evaluate the cross-sectional determinants of marital fertility at the département
level from 1841 to 1901. We find that Religiosity (late 18th c.) explains both fertility
levels and dates of transition. We estimate remarkably strong, significant, and robust
coefficients across specifications. Decreasing late eighteenth century religiosity from
the 75th to the 25th percentile of the distribution predicts a decrease in fertility of
about one standard deviation.
We provide different strategies to suggest a causal effect, by accounting for spatial
correlation and omitted variables. First, we explore issues related to spatial clustering.
Since Religiosity (late 18th c.) and marital fertility have similar spatial dependence
structures, we may falsely identify a correlation that is spurious in nature. As sug-
gested by Kelly (2019), we report Moran statistics and noise simulations at different
weighing schemes to address this. Using fixed-effects takes away all the spatial de-
pendence. Second, we evaluate the role of omitted variables that could drive both
secularization and fertility following Oster (2016). We conclude that omitted vari-
ables do bias our estimates downwards.
Finally, we use district-level variation in religiosity in the late eighteenth century
by exploiting a novel individual-level crowdsourced historical dataset spanning several
centuries (Blanc, 2019; Kaplanis et al., 2018). This data contains all publicly available
genealogies on geni.com and is a representative sample for France from 1700 to 1900.
The raw data consists in individual-level informations (such as dates and places of
Page 3 of 41
birth and death) and intergenerational links.
We reach plausibly causal estimates by accounting for time varying département-
level unobservables with fixed effects. Again, we find strong, significant, and robust
effects of Religiosity (late 18th c.) on fertility, between districts and within départe-
ments. We also find that, while treatment (religiosity in the late eighteenth century)
was positively associated with fertility after secularization, it had a negative and in-
significant effect before, suggesting that we merely capture secularization and not
pre-existing differences that are unobservables. Last but not least we study individu-
als who migrated during childhood, before the change in norms, but were exposed to
secularization in their district of settlement, to strengthen our causal interpretation
and to separate the effect of cultural change from that of intergenerationally transmit-
ted persistent traits. We compare individuals born in the same district and observe
that they adopt the cultural traits of their migration destination at the time of the
process of secularization.
Last but not least, we address the roots of secularization and show that it was
driven by the unchecked spread of the Counter Reformation following the demise of
Protestantism. The austere morality imposed by Jansenists, rigorous followers of a
theological movement that primarily spread in France and disappeared in the first
half of the eighteenth century, could have played a role. While there was religious
competition between Protestants and Catholics in other European countries, such
competition did not take place in France where the Counter Reformation had an
especially strong and unrivalled monopoly after the 1685 Revocation of the Edict of
Nantes which abolished all rights and religious freedom of Protestants. The monopoly
of the Catholic Church on the market for salvation essentially set a price that was too
high to pay for most.
This paper has numerous contributions. First, we are the first to both advance
the hypothesis and demonstrate that the sudden mid-eighteenth century decline in
religiosity precipitated the demographic transition in France. We offer a solution to
a major unsolved puzzle and we substantiate the view that cultural change caused it
(Braudel, 1986b; Sauvy, 1960). Second, we contribute to a vibrant literature that has
documented the persistence of culture over the very long run (Giuliano and Nunn,
2016; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012). However, we empir-
ically establish that cultural change and not persistence can cause long run develop-
ment. By looking at the determinants of change, we also contribute to literatures on
the economic consequences of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in Europe
(Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Becker, Pfaff and Rubin, 2016) and on the cultural
roots of the Industrial Revolution (Mokyr, 2016; Squicciarini, 2017; Squicciarini and
Voigtländer, 2015). This is also the first paper to examine the determinants of rapid
secularization in eighteenth century France. Finally, this is the first research to use
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eighteenth century individual-level data on fertility.
2 Historical background and literature on demographic
change, development, and secularization
2.1 Demographic transition and development
In every respect, eighteenth century France lagged one to two hundreds years behind
England, the cradle of the Industrial Revolution. France attained the GDP per capita
of 1750 England and Wales in the 1920’s (Bolt and van Zanden, 2014; Lévy-Leboyer
and Bourguignon, 1985), the rate of urbanization of 1750 England in 1950 (Bairoch,
Batou and Chèvre, 1988), and the rate of literacy of 1650 England in 1850 (Buringh
and van Zanden, 2009). Weber (1976) depicts Frenchmen as “peasants” and “savages”.
Crouzet (2003) notes that “France remained fundamentally a peasant-based rural econ-
omy. Only in 1911 did employment in industry overtake that in agriculture.” (p. 236),
while Lévy-Leboyer (1968) discusses “the absence of a take-off in France”.
Despite the absence of industrialization in France, France and England did not grow
at different rates in per capita terms after 1750 and throughout the 19th century (Bolt
and van Zanden, 2014) since the rate of population growth in England largely exceeded
that in France. In the two centuries following 1750, the population of England in-
creased from 5, 5 to 40 millions inhabitants, while the population of France increased
from 24, 5 to the same figure in 1950, 40 millions inhabitants. Changing rates of
fertility were already noticed by contemporary observers, and attributed to changing
moral standard and preferences: “it is the same love of ease and convenience that is
filling France with bachelors...men who vanish from the world with all their posterity”
(Goudar, 1756, p.271).
The early transition, a century before the rest of Europe, in an epoch of stagnation,
and before the French Revolution, has generated numerous contributions in the past
50 years (Henry, 1972a,b, 1978; Henry and Houdaille, 1973; Knodel and van de Walle,
1979; Weir, 1994; Wrigley, 1985a,b). Figure 1 displays the rate of gross fertility for
France and England and Wales between 1700 and 1900. In the 1750’s and through-
out the second half of the eighteenth century, the average rate of fertility in France
significantly declined, while it slowly increased in England until 1880. Uncovering
the deep roots has been hampered by data availability due to the early nature of
the fertility decline. In particular, demographer Louis Henry used parish records to
reconstruct village-level series of fertility in the eighteenth century while Coale and
Watkins (1986) tried to assess the importance of economic and cultural factors in
Europe using census data after 1831. There is widespread agreement that cultural
forces caused the transition in France, yet the ultimate cause for the decline remains
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one of the most important unsolved puzzle in the history, demography, and growth
literatures.
Figure 1: Demographic transition in France and England
Note: This figure displays the gross rate of fertility for France and England and Wales over time. Source: Blanc (2019)
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While modern methods of contraception became available well after the onset of
the fertility decline, means of contraception were known at the time. Some innova-
tions did take place in that epoch, such as the spread of early condoms (known as
“redinguote d’Angleterre”, English riding coat (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2019; van de
Walle, 2005)), but these were expensive and not widely used. On the contrary, natural
methods to achieve parity-specific control, such as coitus interruptus (withdrawal) or
implexus restrictus (non-ejaculation), have been known since biblical times (Spolaore
and Wacziarg, 2019), the former originating from the Middle East (van de Walle,
2005). According to van de Walle (2005) withdrawal “was frequently alluded to in
libertine literature” (p. 2), which was particularly widespread in eighteenth century
France (Darnton, 1991) with books such as Venus in the Cloister or The Nun in
her Smock or Diderot’s Indiscreet Jewels. Other methods of contraception, less rele-
vant here, include chastity, late marriage, sodomy, abortion, or infanticide (Braudel,
1986b).
According to standard economic theory, development is the best contraceptive
(Hansen and Prescott, 2002; Kremer, 1993). In the course of history, as technolog-
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ical progress accelerates the return to human capital rises and fertility decisions are
altered, triggering the onset of the transition. While in the Malthusian trap, income
per capita fluctuates around a subsistence level because of the positive relationship
between income and fertility. As quality is favored to quantity, the relationship is
reversed and the economy enters the modern growth era, where human capital is the
main driver of progress (Galor, 2011; Galor and Weil, 2000). The set of endogenous
growth models developed by Galor (2011); Galor and Weil (2000); Galor and Moav
(2002) generates fascinating dynamics and interactions at work in the long run be-
tween human capital accumulation, fertility, and technological progress, but fails to
explain the French demographic transition.
In recent years a number of empirical studies have tried to assess the forces driving
the demographic transition in France, especially by weighing the relative importance of
economic versus cultural forces broadly (de la Croix and Perrin, 2018; Murphy, 2015).3
More related to our analysis of the cultural origins of the transition, Daudin, Franck
and Rapoport (2018) demonstrate that norms of limited fertility diffused within France
and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2019) show that the reduction in the rate of fertility
in 19th century Europe was driven by a process of diffusion of norms originating
from France.4 While these studies highlight processes of diffusion, so far none has
empirically established the cause of the decline in fertility in France.
2.2 Religion, Counter Reformation, and secularization in France
Since medieval times, France has been known as the “the eldest daughter of the Roman
Catholic Church”, French kings as “Rex Christianissimus, “most Christian king”, and
the French as “God’s chosen people” (Burleigh, 2005, p. 23). This section briefly
summarizes the chain of events that brought about a radical change in beliefs and
religiosity in the mid-eighteenth century.
Throughout history, France was a major Roman Catholic country that even hosted
seven successive popes in the XIVth century. During the French Renaissance, and
particularly after the reign of Francis I, Protestantism marginally spread to France
with an estimated 10% of Protestants in the mid-sixteenth century (most of these
Huguenots). The second half of the sixteenth century was a period of violent Religious
Wars and political unrest, whose apex was the massacre of thousands of Protestants on
3Murphy (2015) proposes that the French Revolution may have been one of many causes of the decline.
He examines the cross-sectional determinants of fertility in France and devotes two paragraphs to the effect
of the oath on fertility at the département level in 1831. We hope to demonstrate with more systematic and
rigorous analysis that secularization, not the French Revolution (1789), caused the demographic transition in
France.
4The existence of deep-rooted barriers to the adoption of innovation has been documented in Spolaore
and Wacziarg (2009). See also Delventhal, Fernández-Villaverde and Guner (2019) for the diffusion of the
fertility transition between countries, or Blanc and Wacziarg (2019) for an account of modernization at the
microeconomic level.
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Saint Bartholomew’s Day in 1572. In 1593, after four years fighting a war of succession
against the Holy League to gain access to the throne which he should have inherited
in 1589, Henry IV of France renounced Protestantism and, for the second time since
Saint Bartholomew’s Day, was forced to convert to Catholicism. The promulgation
of the Edict of Nantes in 1598 finally put an end to the French Wars of Religion by
granting Huguenots substantial rights and freedom of religion.
In the 17th century France remained predominantly Catholic and in 1685, Louis
XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes which effectively ended this short period of religious
toleration and led to the emigration of thousands of Protestants.5 This period coin-
cided with a Catholic resurgence and the rise, diffusion and consolidation of Counter
Reformation theological movements in France: the Jesuits and the Jansenists. Impor-
tantly, religious competition was primarily between these two movements, and much
less so with Protestants.
Jansenism spread to France from Louvain (Van Kley, 1996, p. 58) after the posthu-
mous publication in 1640 of Augustinus by Cornelius Jansen, “a Catholic Lutheran”
(Burleigh, 2005, p. 34). Jansenists advocated a rigorist view of Catholicism, with
an emphasis on predestination of the elect to salvation, the limitation of sacrements
and the need for penitence: “Jansenism accentuated humankind’s pristine perfection
and original innocence, the better to underscore the catastrophe of the original sin of
disobedient pride and the ensuing fall.” (Van Kley, 1996, p. 60); “an austere, rigor-
ous creed, that stressed individual study of the scripture in the vernacular, the need
for sincere contrition rather than mere fear of eternal damnation, the infrequency of
communion, and the remoteness of God from a concupiscent humanity.” (Burleigh,
2005, p. 34).
They also strongly opposed the elitism of Jesuits: “this set Jansenism on a collision
course with baroquely lax Catholicism in which the Jesuits could allegedly finesse every-
thing this way or that.” (Burleigh, 2005, p. 34). Van Kley (1996) writes that “against
the Jesuits’ preference for Latin and elites, Port-Royal’s director Le Maitre de Sacy
began to translate the Bible into French, and Pascal appealed to literate opinion”, re-
ferring to the Council of Trent’s interdiction against vernacular Bible translation and
the support of famous scientists such as Blaise Pascal. As a result, Jansenism spread
to rural places, while elites remained acquainted to the Jesuits.
The first half of the eighteenth century in France was characterized by major re-
ligious turmoil and controversies between the two groups, eventually leading to the
decline and demise of Jansenism. In 1709, Louis XIV decreed that the Abbey of Port
Royal des Champs, the center of Jansenism in France, be demolished. In 1713, the
Unigenitus papal bull, supported by the Jesuits, set a number of fierce religious fights
into motion. The bull was an apostolic constitution condemning 101 Jansenist views
5See Hornung (2014) for the long run effects of the forced migration of Huguenots to Prussia.
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described by theologian Pasquier Quesnel.
In the following years, the bull generated major controversies (Van Kley, 1996). The
Convulsionnaires of Saint-Médard, a group of Jansenists, would gather in cemeteries
and holy places to convulse and declare miraculous healings. From the 1720’s and
until the 1740’s, Jesuits bishops and clergy would deny sacrements and burial in
consecrated ground to the faithful unless they could provide a proof of acceptance
of Unigenitus such as billets de confession, papers that affirmed submission to the
bull and had to be signed by the archbishop of Paris. The billets were very much
denounced by Catholics in news articles all across France (Perez, 1999).
Around 1750 however, a sudden, rapid, and widespread process of secularization
took place in France. de Tocqueville (1856) writes that “irreligion was able to become a
general and dominant passion in eighteenth-century France” (Book 3, Chapter 2). The
Counter Reformation has been advanced as a plausible explanation but no ultimate
cause has yet been uncovered.6 Norberg (1985) notes that “Historians have been
too preoccupied establishing the meaning, chronology, and social composition of this
phenomenon to speculate on its deeper causes” (p. 302).
The austere morality slowly and forcibly imposed by the Counter Reformation in
France, the rigorism of Jansenists, or religious controversies and competition with
Jesuits are believed to have precipitated the decline in religiosity and social unrest
(Tackett, 1986; Van Kley, 1996).7 Hoffman (1984) argues that “the Counter Reforma-
tion’s austere morality was imposed in full force (...) not surprisingly, it was rejected
by people who saw nothing wrong in combining devotion and gaiety” (p. 138).8
Thereby, many regions of France experienced a widespread process of secularization
as soon as in the late 1740’s. There was substantial heterogeneity in the extent of the
religiosity decline and, in particular, it has been documented in the regions of Provence
and Auverge-Rhône-Alpes (in the dioceses of Grenoble and Lyon) by Hoffman (1984);
Norberg (1985); Vovelle (1973).9 In regions such as Brittany, there is much more
limited evidence that such change occurred (Tingle, 2012), while Paris stayed rather
religious with substantial variance (Chaunu, 1978).
Finally, Chartier (1991) describes how regions such as Savoy experienced a radically
different evolution from that on the other side of the border: “habits thus seem to have
been quite different on different sides of the frontier, which suggests the singularity of
dechristianization in France.” (p. 97).
6We provide an empirical evaluation of the causes of the decline in religiosity in Section 6.
7See Cantoni, Dittmar and Yuchtman (2018) on the role of religious competition between Protestants and
Catholics on secularization.
8Tackett (1986) evokes “epic struggles with the Jesuits” (p. 6) and argues that “a whole series of affaires
and causes célèbres, from the repression of the convulsionnaries in the 1730’s through the billets de confes-
sions in the 1750’s and the expulsion the Jesuits in the 1760’s, had contributed in broadly publicizing and
intensifying grievances toward the clergy.” (p. 257).
9This change was reflected by a decline in legacies for perpetual masses and offerings to the church, a
decline in the request for burials in holy places, and a decline in the number of invocations of the Virgin Mary.
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Figure 2, displays the spatial distribution of Religiosity (late 18th c.) and marital
fertility in 1866 (details on the main variables are provided in Section 3). Some
regions, particularly Brittany, Paris, and Occitanie, remained very religious while
other regions such as Provence and Auverge-Rhône-Alpes were much less religious in
the late eighteenth century, in line with existing historical and anecdotal evidence on
the decline (Chaunu, 1978; Hoffman, 1984; Norberg, 1985; Tingle, 2012; Vovelle, 1973).
We also notice that the two maps superimpose almost perfectly (with a correlation
coefficient of ρ = .6), while Savoy has a high level of marital fertility consistent with
the anecdotal evidence presented by Chartier (1991) on its religiosity level.
Figure 2: Religiosity and fertility
Note: This figure displays the spatial distribution of late eighteenth century religiosity and of the fertility index Ig in
1866. Religiosity (late 18th c.) is defined as the share of refractory clergy (non-jurors) in 1791. Section 3 details these
measures. Appendix Figure 3.2.1 provides other maps
(Panel A) Religiosity (late eighteenth century) (Panel B) Fertility index Ig (1866)
3 Data
This section present our main data sources and variables. We introduce our main
explanatory variable in Section 3.1. In 3.2 and 3.3 we present the dependent vari-
ables and controls at the département and at the individual and district levelsl, with
corresponding summary statistics in Tables 3.2.1 and 3.3.1.
There are 90 départements and 513 districts in 19th century France.10 Départements
are the main administrative units in France since 1790, all of nearly equal size (about
6, 000 miles) and designed to ensure that travel distance by horse from any location
within the department to the main administrative center would not exceed one day.
Districts are lower units, with close to no administrative purpose, created in 1790 such
10For regions, we use the 2016 division of 13 regions. We generate district boundaries with Thiessen
polygons.
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that there could not be more than 9 or less than 3 districts per département (which
was practically their sole feature). They were replaced by and merged into (larger)
arrondissements in 1795.
3.1 Religiosity
Religiosity (late 18th c.) Our main explanatory variable throughout the pa-
per is Religiosity (late eighteenth century). This is a measure of the outcome of the
sudden process of secularization. We construct this measure of post-secularization
religiosity from the share of refractory clergy in 1791. In July 1790, during the French
Revolution, the National Constituent Assembly passed the Civil Constitution of the
Clergy which required all clergymen to swear an oath of loyalty to the State. We use
the share of clergymen that did not take the oath (“refractory clergy”, or “non-jurors”)
to proxy for late eighteenth century religiosity.
According to Tackett (1986), “the regional reactions of clergymen in 1791 can be
revealing of the attitudes and religious options of the lay population with which the
clergymen lived ” (p. xvi). There is evidence that the oath generated passionate
debates and reactions from the population: “the issue of the oath soon became a
veritable obsession, unleashing emotional reactions and factional strife in parishes
everywhere” (Tackett, 1986, p. 4).
This measure has been commonly used in the literature as a proxy to religiosity
in late eighteenth century France (Franck and Johnson, 2016; Squicciarini, 2017).
According to Tackett (1986), “the map of clerical reactions in 1791 was remarkably
similar to the map of religious practice in the middle of the twentieth century” (p. xv).
Indeed, the presence of refractory clergy is highly correlated with religious practices
and attitudes in the 19th and 20th century, with a correlation coefficient of ρ = .7 in
the 1950’s (Tackett, 1986, p. xvi) and similarly for the number of priests and church
attendance in the 19th and well into the 20th century (Squicciarini, 2017). This is
remarkable to the extent that it suggests that the early and rapid secularization was
followed by centuries of persistence.
Importantly the share of refractory clergy is measured before the August 1792 decree
that ordered all non-jurors to leave the country and before the establishment of anti-
clerical cults (the Cult of Reason and the Cult of the Supreme Being among others),
the War in Vendée, the Paris Commune, and the Reign of Terror. Hence, it does not
capture the effect of main Revolutionary events and policies of dechristianization but
rather religious attitudes before the French Revolution, that is the outcome of the
1750 secularization process.
The data is available at the département, diocese, and district levels and is con-
structed from the choice of more than 50, 000 parish clergymen, that is more than
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90% of all curés and vicaires holding posts in 1791 France (Tackett, 1986, p. 39).11
At the district level, the share of non-oath taking priests is seemingly uniformly dis-
tributed from 0 to 1, while it varies from .8 to .91 at the département level, with an
average of 48%.
Religiosity (pre-secularization) controls We supplement this with data on
pre-secularization religiosity in order to capture the extent of the religiosity decline
and not pre-existing differences. At the département level, our set of pre-secularization
religiosity controls include the number of clergymen per capita, the average tithe in
1750, the number of abbeys in 1756, centuries of jesuit presence until 1763, and finally
the share of Protestants after the 1685 revocation of the edict of Nantes.12 The first
three measures aim at capturing religiosity in the pre-1750 era (note the particularly
high number of clergymen, in average 1 for each 500 inhabitants in France), while the
following two are standard measures used capture the presence of specific religious
groups that may especially matter for upper tail human capital.13 At the district
level, we use the number of abbeys and the centuries of jesuit presence.
Correlates of secularization Table 3.1.1 presents the correlation matrix of
religiosity in the late 18th c., pre-secularization religiosity, and various measures of
development (urbanization), human capital (literacy), and “culture” (Encyclopedie
subscriptions) at the département level. Religiosity in the late eighteenth century is
not significantly correlated to any of the pre-secularization religiosity proxies. How-
ever, importantly, it is positively correlated with urbanization (ρ = .261, significant at
the 5% level). The sign is the opposite as that of the correlation before secularization
(ρ = −.206, significant at the 10% level), which indicates that the decline in reli-
giosity happened mostly in rural areas. This is a rather surprising fact to the extent
that urbanization (development) and religiosity are usually believed to be negatively
correlated (Barro and McCleary, 2003). This French idiosyncrasy, if anything, would
downward bias our estimates of the effect of secularization (the effect of Religiosity
11At the département level, Religiosity (late eighteenth century) is constructed as a district population-
weighed average of the district-level share of refractory clergy. In doing so, we ensure that rural districts,
which may have more clergymen per capita, do not bias the average département-level value.
12Clergymen per capita is measured in 1791, at the same time as the share of refractory clergymen is
measured. However this is a stock while the share of refractory clergy measures the intensity of the religiosity
decline. It is unlikely that the total number of clergymen would have immediately declined following the
decline in religiosity (and if it did, it would drive the coefficient on the share of refractory clergy to zero).
From 1791 to 1995, the number of clergymen in France only decreased from 50, 000 to 30, 000 (source). Our
point estimates are larger in most regressions if we do not add this control. The share of Protestants is
measured in 1815. We do not include the 1670 measure (the only other available year) because we want to
capture the effect of the revocation of the edict of Nantes in 1685. Including the 1670 share of Protestants
instead does not change our point estimates but increases standard errors due to a lower number of observation.
13To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research to empirically control for pre-1750 religious attitudes
in France. The number of clergymen per capita and the average tithe (tax rate) seem like natural candidates
to proxy for religiosity, while there is evidence that abbeys and monasteries played a significant role in local
religious life (Heldring, Robinson and Vollmer, 2017).
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(late 18th c.) controlling for pre-secularization religiosity) since urban places are also
centers of innovation and human capital accumulation.
3.2 Département level
Marital fertility The main dependent variable at the département level is the
index of marital fertility Ig. The index has been constructed by Coale and Watkins
(1986) as part of the Princeton European Fertility Project (PEFP), and is available
for about 80 départements. The PEFP provides data at the sub-national level for all
countries in Europe, at the département level for France.14
The index Ig measures the fertility of a population relative to the maximum that
might be attained, that is “how closely the married population approaches the maxi-
mum fertility it might experience” (Coale and Watkins, 1986, p. 161). It is constructed
from the counts of the French census. It equals the total number of children born to
married women divided by the number of children that would be born from these
women should they not practice any form of limitation, using data from the Hut-
terites, an Anabaptist sect that does not practice any fertility control:
(Ig)i =
Bmi∑
jMijGj
with Bmi the total number of children born from married women in society i, Mij
the number of married women in age cohort j, and Gj the rate of fertility of Hutterites
for age cohort j. We focus on marital fertility rather than overall fertility because
it is the standard measure in the literature to detect the presence of fertility control
achieved through parity-specific means (Coale and Watkins, 1986).
In Table 3.2.1, Panel A, we present summary statistics for the index of marital
fertility. The index is available for 19 years from 1831 to 1961, and decreases from
.56 to .33. Throughout Section 4, we report cross-sectional regressions for 1866 in the
text (the earliest time a region other than France, Latvia, experienced a sustained
decline in fertility) and the regressions for four selected years (1841, 1861, 1881, and
1901) in the appendix. Alternatively, in some specifications, we also use the first year
of transition below a marital fertility index of .5 (estimated between 1831 and 1961).
Controls We supplement this data with a set of controls used in the départe-
ment-level regressions in Section 4. We present this set in Table 3.2.2, while Fig-
ure 3.2.1 displays the spatial distribution of some variables of interest.
As mentioned in 3.1, we primarily control for pre-secularization religiosity. We
14A number of minor issues have been identified with the data from the PEFP, mainly with respect to the
identification of the presence of fertility controls, see Brown and Guinnane (2007); Guinnane (2011). These
issues are less relevant in our context since we study fertility levels after the transition already took place.
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also control for broadly defined cultural and institutional factors with a dummy that
measures the presence of a printing press in 1500, the number of books printed in
1500, Encyclopedie Subscriptions per capita in 1776-1779 (as a proxy to the diffusion
of the Enlightenment), dummies for Pays status (fiscal regions in Ancien Régime
France, which may capture cultural differences or state capacity), and a dummy for the
presence of a University before 1750. We further control for education using the rate of
literacy of conscripts in the year of observation. Finally, we control for pre-industrial
development with département population (a standard proxy in the pre-industrial era)
and average soldier height from 1716 to 1749, and contemporary development with the
log of the rate of urbanization in the year of observation (urbanization being defined
as the share of the population living in towns of more than 5, 000 inhabitants).
3.3 Individual and district level
We supplement the département level data with a new crowdsourced historical in-
dividual level dataset from Blanc (2019), who reconstructs rates of fertility at the
individual level from publicly available genealogies posted on geni.com and scrapped
by Kaplanis et al. (2018). Lineage reconstruction from crowdsourced genealogies re-
lies on the work of descendants reconstituting their family tree today using their own
family history and searching through the same parish records as the ones used by
demographers.15
Importantly, parish records are available online with unrestricted access in all French
departments from the mid-17th century onwards. The resulting dataset contains
thousands of individuals and is nationally representative of France from 1700 to 1900,
with observables in the dataset highly correlated (ρ > .9) with all available measures
for France (see Blanc (2019) for a detailed discussion).
An important caveat is that a significant number of observations in the sample may
not have a recorded horizontal lineage as individuals reconstituting their family tree
today have a greater incentives recording their direct ancestors (the vertical lineage)
rather than the horizontal branches. As a consequence, we could have incomplete
fertility series. Following Blanc (2019), we deal with this issue by defining the fertility
sample, the sample of individuals for which at least one parent in any of the four
generations preceding the individual observation is recorded as having a fertility rate
strictly greater than one.16 In our analysis, we either restrict the sample to the
fertility sample or include a fertility sample dummy that allows to gain some power
while controlling for this bias.17
15It is assumed that they do so with a greater efficacy due to their knowledge of family history and past
migrations, and own personal incentives.
16We discard the rate of fertility of individual i in assessing this.
17Finally, since the dataset does not always contain both spouses, we cluster all regressions at the couple
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The rate of fertility at the individual level is simply the total number of children ever
born. While the département level data is only available after 1831, the individual-
level data contains individuals observed between 1700 to 1900.18 All observations
contain geo-coded places of birth, marriage, and death, which allows to match indi-
viduals with Religiosity (late 18th c.) at the district level.
In Figure 3.3.1, Panel A, we display the towns of birth included in the main sample
and in the fertility sample, while Panel B displays district-level variation in Religiosity
(late eighteenth century) along with district and département boundaries. In our pre-
ferred specifications, we include département by period fixed effects and thus exploit
within département, between districts, variation in late 18th religiosity (accounting
for time-varying département-level unobservables). We present summary statistics for
observations in the fertility sample in Table 3.3.1. There are 18, 663 observations. In
average, individuals in the sample have 3.85 children while their parents have 4.65.
At the district of birth level, the average Religiosity (late 18th c.) is .59.
4 Main empirical findings at the département level
4.1 Baseline results
Determinants of Ig We explore the cross-sectional determinants of Ig from
1831 to 1901 and estimate Equation (1) separately for each year t using OLS. Our
main variable of interest is Religiosityi,late 18th c.. We expect β̂t to be strictly positive
and, as discussed in Section 3, to be downwards biased.
(1) (Ig)i,t = βt ×Religiosityi,late 18th c. +X ′i,tδt + εi,t
Table 1 reports the results for 1866, along with robust standard errors. We estimate
that an increase in Religiosity (late 18th c.) of 1 percentage point is associated with
an increase in the fertility index of about .35 pp. This is a remarkably large effect
since the average marital fertility index in France was .49 in that year, about half
the Hutterites standard. We also report standardized coefficients: throughout speci-
fications, increasing Religiosity (late 18th c.) from the 25th to the 75th percentile of
the distribution is predicted to increase Ig of about .13 points, exactly one standard
deviation.
Our estimates are stable and significant at the 1% level across all specifications. In
column (2), we control for proxies to Ancien Régime, pre-secularization religiosity in
order to capture secularization. Especially, we control for the number of clergymen
level and use a male dummy accounting for possible gender differences. Since we also cluster standard errors at
the district level (Religiosity (late 18th c.) is measured at the district level), we implement two-way clustered
standard errors using Stata command vce2way (Yoo, 2019).
18We proxy marriage, the year of observation, with the year of birth of the first child.
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per capita, the number of abbeys, and the average rate of the tithe collected by the
church. Column (3) adds regions fixed effects to account for unobserved cultural or
economic factors that may confound the effect of late eighteenth century religiosity
(for example, shared identity or language could have an effect on broadly defined
modernization (Weber, 1976)). In (4), we further control for observed cultural and
institutional factors. In particular we control for fiscal status (Pays d’élection, d’Etat,
or d’imposition) in the Ancien Régime. Indeed, it could be that state capacity and
state history had an impact on both secularization and fertility, especially in a time
when the State and the Church shared many privileges. Also we worry that, since
our measure is an oath of allegiance to the State, we only capture the effect of state
authority. We also control for Encyclopedie subscriptions in order to capture the
diffusion of the Enlightenment and the presence of local knowledge elites, who may
have an impact on cultural change and the modernization of society as a whole. In
column (5), we control for literacy and education to account for the quantity-quality
trade-off. Finally we account for pre-industrial and contemporary development in (6)
and (7), and our results remain virtually unchanged.
Appendix Table 4.1.1 reports results on the determinants of marital fertility for
eight selected years, while we display the scatterplots of marital fertility against late
eighteenth century religiosity, with and without controls, in Figures 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.
Table 1: Determinants of Ig (1866)
Note: This table displays the results of the cross-sectional regression of the marital fertility index Ig in 1866 on late
eighteenth century religiosity. Religiosity (late 18th c.) is defined as the share of refractory clergy (non-jurors) in 1791.
Controls are described in Appendix Table 3.2.2. All observations are weighed by département population in the year of
observation. We report robust standard errors. Appendix Table 4.1.1 displays the results of the same regression at differ-
ent points in time.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1866
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.352*** 0.363*** 0.377*** 0.343*** 0.340*** 0.338*** 0.332***
(0.055) (0.057) (0.065) (0.062) (0.063) (0.068) (0.072)
Religiosity (pre-secularization) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cultural and institutional factors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education and schooling Yes Yes Yes
Pre-industrial development Yes Yes
Contemporary development Yes
Mean of Ig (1866) .49 .48 .48 .48 .48 .48 .48
Standard deviation of Ig (1866) .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12
Perc. 25-75 Religiosity (late 18th c.) .13 .13 .14 .13 .13 .13 .12
Observations 84 80 80 80 80 80 80
R-squared 0.36 0.41 0.65 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.81
Determinants of dates of transition We turn to the determinants of transi-
tion year and estimate Equation 2, where the dependent variable is the year in which
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Ig first declined below .5.
(2) (First year with Ig < .5)i = β ×Religiosityi,late 18th c. +X ′i,1831δ + εi
Table 2 reports our results. We estimate that an increase in Religiosity (late 18th
c.) from 0% to 100% is associated with a delay in the year of transition of almost
120 years.19 Again, we estimate stable and robust coefficients, all significant at the
1% level. In the absence of the decline in religiosity, with Religiosity (late 18th c.)
set to 1 everywhere, the average Frenchman would have first had a marital fertility
index below .5 in about 1920 instead of 1862, which is comparable to the timing of
the decline observed in the rest of Europe.
Table 2: Determinants of transition date (Ig < .5)
Note: This table displays the results of the same regression as in Table 1, using the first year with Ig < .5 as a depen-
dent variable.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: First year with fertility index Ig lower than .5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 98.112*** 99.647*** 120.262*** 111.710*** 112.670*** 117.506*** 118.735***
(13.241) (13.323) (18.957) (18.507) (18.117) (18.884) (19.632)
Religiosity (pre-secularization) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cultural and institutional factors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education and schooling Yes Yes Yes
Pre-industrial development Yes Yes
Contemporary development Yes
Mean of dep var 1863 1862 1862 1862 1862 1862 1861
Standard deviation of dep var 34 34 34 34 34 34 33
Perc. 25-75 Religiosity (late 18th c.) 36 37 44 41 41 43 44
Observations 85 80 80 80 80 80 78
R-squared 0.40 0.45 0.62 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.76
4.2 Accounting for spatial dependence
We have so far found large and highly significant results. Yet, the spatial distribution
of Religiosity (late 18th c.) and marital fertility is geographically clustered, which may
lead us to mistakenly interpret results as strong and robust although spurious in nature
(Kelly, 2019). Indeed, intuitively, if both the dependent and the independent variable
are spatially correlated, the standard error of the coefficient will not be adjusted for the
fact that close observations are naturally more likely to possess the same attributes,
hence resulting in inflated t-stats.
The degree of spatial correlation could most certainly be explained by the fact that
19Because of non-random measurement error (some départements already had a fertility level lower than
50% that of the Hutterites in 1831, and these are likely to have lower religiosity), we arguably under-estimate
the true effect of Religiosity (late 18th c.) on the date of transition.
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religiosity is a cultural attribute. Nonetheless, we remain agnostic on what causes it as
we deal with this issue. An important portion of the growth and deep roots literature
has dealt with the problem of spatial dependence by reporting adjusted standard
errors (Conley, 1999). However, Kelly (2019) demonstrates that Conley standard
errors are often misleadingly small due to unrealistically set low cutoff values (the
distance after which it is assumed that spatial correlation vanishes), while the degree
of spatial dependence is not rigorously assessed or tested for.
Kelly (2019) proposes the following solutions, which we implement for two assumed
correlation ranges of 250 and 500 kilometers (to the best of our knowledge, this is the
first paper in the growth literature to do so), on top of computing Conley-adjusted
standard errors. First, reporting the p-value of Moran’s test for spatial dependence of
OLS residuals. Second, reporting the results of simulations where the dependent and
the independent variables are alternatively replaced by spatial noise. We run 1, 000
independent simulations and report the fraction of regressions significant at the .1%
level.
Our results are displayed in Table 3. In Panel A, we provide the outcome of the
aforementioned tests for spatial correlation. In Assumption 1 (2), we assume a corre-
lation range of 250 (500) kilometers. Moran’s statistics is significant (with p < .01)
in the first two specifications and for both ranges, suggesting a high degree of spa-
tial correlation. Moreover, in these specifications, spatial noise significantly explains
marital fertility at the .1% in about 10% of simulations (and similarly for the frac-
tion of simulations where religiosity in the late eighteenth century explains noise),
for both correlation ranges. Panel B displays the estimated coefficient on Religiosity
(late 18th c.) (as in Table 1) as well as spatial correlation-adjusted standard errors.
Correspondingly, in the first specification, the Conley standard error increase from
.052 (un-adjusted, non-robust) to .080 and .093 as the correlation range increases.
However, our results remain highly significant.
In column (3), we add region fixed effects in order to capture unobserved regional
characteristics such as unobserved economic development or cultural traits (shared
identity or language). Column (4) adds, among other things, pays status dummies in
order to capture the effect of state capacity and state history. By looking at within-
region and within-pays variation, we hope to reduce the extent of spatial dependence
(Case, 1991). After the inclusion of these fixed effects, the p-value of Moran’s test
significantly increases and we fail to reject the null that errors are randomly distributed
across the landscape. Furthermore, the fraction of significant simulations approaches
zero and Conley standard errors become smaller than non-adjusted standard errors.
In Appendix Table 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, we display our results at different points in time
and for the determinants of transition year. We conclude that accounting for spatial
dependence with fixed effects significantly improves the precision of our estimations.
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This suggests that our results are not spurious and cannot be explained by simply
fitting spatial noise.
Table 3: Accounting for spatial dependance in the determinants of Ig (1866)
Note: This table displays the results of the cross-sectional regression of the marital fertility index Ig in 1866 on late
eighteenth century religiosity, and various tests to assess the extent of spatial dependence. Religiosity (late 18th c.) is
defined as the share of refractory clergy (non-jurors) in 1791. Controls are described in Appendix Table 3.2.2. All obser-
vations are weighed by département population in the year of observation. Assumption 1 (2) assumes a correlation range
of 250 (500) kilometers. Results under Assumption 2 are displayed in parenthesis. Moran statistics are computed using an
inverse distance spatial weighing matrix. Conley standard errors are computed using the Stata code provided by Hsiang
(2010), and assuming a linearly declining spatial weighing kernel. Appendix Tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 display the same set
of results at different points in time, and for the determinants of transition year.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1866
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Testing spatial correlation on OLS residuals
Assumption 1: 250 kilometers correlation range ; 2: 500 kms (in parenthesis)
p-val of Moran’s test for spatial
dependence (H0: error is iid) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .57 (.93) .81 (.87) .78 (.93) .84 (.81) .93 (.76)
Fraction of simulations with
significant (p=.001) spatial noise 12% (10%) 12% (13%) 8% (5%) 1% (0%) 1% (0%) 1% (0%) 1% (0%)
Fraction of simulations where independent
variable explains (p=.001) noise 9% (11%) 8% (12%) 5% (2%) 3% (2%) 3% (2%) 3% (2%) 2% (2%)
Panel B: Spatial correlation-adjusted standard errors
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.352 0.363 0.377 0.343 0.340 0.338 0.332
Non-adjusted standard errors (0.052)*** (0.055)*** (0.065)*** (0.056)*** (0.057)*** (0.057)*** (0.059)***
Conley standard errors (Assumption 1) 〈0.080〉*** 〈0.074〉*** 〈0.075〉*** 〈0.052〉*** 〈0.051〉*** 〈0.055〉*** 〈0.059〉***
Conley standard errors (Assumption 2) [0.092]*** [0.084]*** [0.070]*** [0.040]*** [0.041]*** [0.047]*** [0.047]***
Religiosity (pre-secularization) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cultural and institutional factors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education and schooling Yes Yes Yes
Pre-industrial development Yes Yes
Contemporary development Yes
4.3 Accounting for omitted variables
While reverse causality is practically not an issue and we have ruled out the possibility
of spatial dependence and spurious correlation driving our results, omitted variables
may result in bias. This section addresses the issue of unobservables. We rely on
Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005); Oster (2016) to construct bounds to the true effect
while accounting for unobservables. We remain agnostic about the drivers of selection
or the direction of the bias, and conclude that OLS results are downwards biased.
It is easy to imagine that religious areas would place more emphasis on tradition
broadly defined, and be less prone to innovation and change, which would bias our
estimates upwards and be a threat to identification. Yet, the standard drivers of secu-
larization (development broadly defined, see Barro and McCleary (2003)) do not apply
to 1750 France. Religiosity was positively correlated to urbanization in late eighteenth
century France, after the process of secularization took place, while it was negatively
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correlated before (see Section 3). Since urban centers have historically been centers
of innovation (both technological and societal) and human capital accumulation, we
would therefore expect our estimates to be downwards biased, towards zero.
Oster (2016) shows that both coefficient stability and movements in the R-squared
are informative of the bias resulting from unobservable selection. She suggests a pro-
cedure that results in the estimation of a β∗(R2max, δ) statistics, which converges in
probability to the true β (with δ the degree of proportionality between unobservable
and observable selection and R2max the maximum possible R-squared given measure-
ment error). Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005); Oster (2016) suggest to use δ = 1 as
an upper bound, implying equal selection, that is that unobservables and observables
are equally related to the treatment. Oster shows that if 0 does not lie in the interval
between the the OLS coefficient and β∗(R2max, 1) (Oster’s beta), then we can reject the
null that the coefficient of interest is exclusively driven by unobservables. Through-
out this section, we alternatively make the two following assumptions on selection on
unobservables:
Assumption A. Unobservable selection is exactly proportional to selection on ob-
servables.
Assumption B. Unobservable selection is exactly proportional to selection on the
diffusion of the Age of Enlightenment (as proxied by log 1+ Encyclopedie subscriptions
per capita in 1777− 1779) conditional on other observables.
The first assumption is fairly standard, while Assumption B relies on the idea that
we can learn about unobservables explaining marital fertility from unobservable de-
terminants of Encyclopedie subscriptions per capita, a standard measure to proxy for
the diffusion of the Age of Enlightenment (Darnton, 1973; Squicciarini and Voigtlän-
der, 2015). Using this proxy of a different dimension of cultural change allows us
to sensibly model unobservables that may have affected marital fertility. Intuitively,
although this is an over-simplification, we assume that the Age of Enlightenment
affected marital fertility through unobserved factors (e.g. libertinage, emphasis on
change as opposed to tradition, industrial mindset) that are also correlated with sec-
ularization. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to rely on such an
assumption whithin the framework provided by Oster.
In both cases we assume that the degree of proportionality is one, but we also
report the δ statistics, which reflects how strong selection on unobservables should be
to explain away the estimated effect of Religiosity (late 18th c.).20 Following Oster
(2016), we set R2max = min{1.3R2, .9}. However, we assume that measurement error
due to the historical nature of the data bounds the maximum R2 at .9.
20Formally, Oster defines δ such that δσ1X/σ21 = σ2X/σ
2
2 , with σ denoting covariance, X denoting Reli-
giosity (late 18th c.), and indexes 1 and 2 denoting, respectively, observables and unobservables.
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Appendix Tables 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 report the results of the regression on the determi-
nants of Ig in 1866 and for eight selected years accounting for unobservable selection.21
Panel A relies on Assumption A and Panel B on Assumption B, which is our main
assumption. We report bootstrapped standard errors over 1, 000 replications. Our
results are virtually unaffected by unobservable selection. Across specifications we
consistently estimate larger coefficient than OLS under the equal selection assump-
tion.
In order to assess the degree of selection that would be needed to explain away our
results, we rely on the δ statistics and conclude that, in most specifications, selection
on unobservables would have to be twice as strong as selection on observables to
drive our estimates to zero. In Panel B, we even estimate in some specifications
that selection on unobservables would have to be of a different sign than that of the
selection on Encyclopedie subscriptions to explain away our results.
Figure 3: Determinants of Ig and counterfactual accounting for unobservables
(1831-1901)
Note: This figure displays the estimated impact of Religiosity (late 18th c.) on marital fertility over time. Religiosity
(late 18th c.) is defined as the share of refractory clergy (non-jurors) in 1791. Panel A displays the estimated coefficients
accounting for the full set of controls under no selection (OLS) and equal selection (βB), where Oster’s beta is computed
under Assumption B. The grey area represents Oster’s bounds to the true effect. We report Conley standard errors for
OLS and bootstrapped standard errors for βB . Panel B displays the marital fertility index for France and England and
Wales over time, along with a counterfactual index for France.
(Panel A) Omitted variables-adjusted coefficient (Panel B) Counterfactual fertility
We plot the effect of Religiosity (late 18th c.) over time in Figure 3. Panel A
displays the estimated coefficients (OLS and omitted variable-adjusted coefficient) for
Religiosity (late 18th c.) as well as Oster’s bounds from 1831 to 1901. The bias
arising from unobservable selection is practically null until 1870, and that it becomes
negative afterwards. The former is consistent with the observation that Religiosity
(late 18th c.) is uncorrelated to most proxies of development in the late eighteenth
century. The latter can be explained by the fact that unobserved factors such as a
21Appendix Table 4.3.3 display similar results on the determinants of transition year.
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lower emphasis on tradition, a scientific and industrial mindset, were likely to play
an observable role in the latter phases of development as income per capita took off
and the second phase of the demographic transition started. Panel B displays the
marital fertility index for France and England and Wales over time, along with a
counterfactual index for France, which is inputed by setting Religiosity (late 18th c.)
to 100% under the coefficient bounds suggested by Oster while keeping everything else
constant (especially pre-secularization religiosity). This would be the level of fertility
in France if no clergymen took the oath of allegiance to the secular state. Again,
secularization accounts for the vast majority of the cross-sectional difference between
France and England and Wales.
4.4 Mechanisms and alternative explanations
We turn to alternative explanations and mechanisms that could have played a role
in mitigating of permitting the effect of Religiosity (late 18th c.) on marital fertility.
Especially we explore the role played by development and the Enlightenment, which
we describe below in more details.
Table 4 presents out results on the determinants of marital fertility in 1866, with
the full set of controls in each specification.22 The first dimension, in Panel A, is
development broadly defined. We do not expect it to have played a significant role
alone in the large decline in the rate of fertility in the 1750’s since there was no major
change to development levels at the time, but we wish to test two hypothesis. The
first, advanced by Braudel (1986a,b), is that France was overpopulated. In other
words the malthusian constraint was binding, resulting in a permanent escape from
the malthusian trap. This is an attracting theory especially since France was indeed
5 times as populated as England in 1750. In column (1), we look at the effect of
population density (measured as the number of inhabitants per squared km) on marital
fertility. We find a negative coefficient: densely populated areas had lower fertility
in 1866. Yet, the effect is small and economically insignificant since the average
département had 60 inhabitants per sq km in 1793. The estimated coefficient becomes
statistically insignificant in column (2), after controlling for Religiosity (late 18th c.).
The second hypothesis relates to the interaction between cultural and economic
factors. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2019) show that, in a model of social distance and
fertility decisions, a reduction in the intrinsic benefits of fertility relative its costs is
not a sufficient condition for fertility to decline, unless it is accompanied by a change
in social norms preventing birth control. The inverse also holds true, that a change in
social norms is merely not sufficient since economic factors need to allow the change in
22In Table 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 we provide the same set of results for selected years and the determinants of
transition date.
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preference to translate into lower fertility. We proxy for development with the log rate
of urbanization. In column (3) we include this variable alone and find a statistically
insignificant positive association. The positive sign could be explained by the fact
that the coefficient is likely confounded by religiosity in the late eighteenth century,
since religiosity was higher in urban places. After including Religiosity (late 18th c.),
the coefficient on urbanization becomes negative, but is still statistically insignificant.
In column (5), we add an interaction term between Religiosity (late 18th c.) and
urbanization. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive, which substantiate
the intuition that a change in social norms is not a sufficient condition. However, it
is statistically insignificant.
Table 4: Mechanisms and alternative explanations (1866)
Note: This table displays the results of the cross-sectional regression of the marital fertility index Ig in 1866 on late
eighteenth century religiosity, and various tests to assess mechanisms (especially on the role of the Enlightenment and
development). Religiosity (late 18th c.) is defined as the share of refractory clergy (non-jurors) in 1791. Each specifi-
cation relies on the full set of controls described in Appendix Table 3.2.2. Specification (7) is therefore identical to the
last specification in Table 1. All observations are weighed by département population. We report robust standard errors.
Appendix Table 4.4.1 displays the results of the same regression at different points in time, and for the determinants of
transition year.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1866
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.318*** 0.341*** 0.303 0.338*** 0.411*** 0.312***
(0.073) (0.079) (0.322) (0.068) (0.078) (0.075)
Panel A: Development
Population density (1866) -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log Urbanization (1866) 0.013 -0.013 -0.018 0.005
(0.034) (0.029) (0.057) (0.033)
× Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.013
(0.112)
Panel B: Enlightenment
log 1 + SubEnc (1777-1779) -0.052** -0.049*** 0.003 -0.052***
(0.023) (0.015) (0.042) (0.018)
× Religiosity (late 18th c.) -0.097
(0.077)
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 81 80 81 80 80 81 80 80 80
R-squared 0.66 0.77 0.64 0.77 0.77 0.68 0.80 0.81 0.81
Finally, we explore the effect of the Age of Enlightenment on marital fertility. Col-
umn (6) displays the coefficient on Encyclopedie subscriptions per capita alone. We
find a negative, large and statistically and economically significant effect, even after
accounting for late eighteenth century religiosity in (7). However, the diffusion of the
Enlightenment alone is unlikely to explain the fertility decline, since France was by
no means an outlier in Europe (Mokyr, 2016; Roche, 2000). The Republic of Letters
and Age of Enlightenment spread all over the continent and especially in England and
Scotland (Buringh and van Zanden, 2009), where the demographic transition started
in the late 19th century. In column (8), we include an interaction term between Reli-
giosity (late 18th c.) and log 1+SubEnc to test wether secularization had a stronger
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effect on marital fertility in places that were exposed to the Enlightenment. We ex-
pect the coefficient on the interaction term to be positive if our hypothesis holds true.
However it is negative and statistically insignificant. Finally, in the last column, we
include all regressors at the same time. Urbanization and Encyclopedie subscriptions
remain negative and significant, but the coefficient on Religiosity (late 18th c.) is
virtually unchanged.
5 Individual-level results
In this section, we turn to individual-level analysis in order to achieve suggested
causal estimates and to evaluate the determinants of the fertility decline at the time
of the decline. We explore the cross-sectional determinants of the rate of fertility of
individuals observed throughout the 18th and 19th century. This is the first research
to use country-wide (individual-level) data on fertility dating back to 1700.
Baseline results We estimate Equation 3, where log ferti,t is the log of the
total number of children ever born to individual i, observed in period t.23 Each
individual is assigned the level of Religiosity (late 18th c.) of its district of birth d(i),
and we report clustered standard errors at the district level. We also account for time
fixed effects λt in order to only capture cross-sectional variation. In our preferred
specification, we hope to reach causal estimates by exploiting within département,
between districts, variation as we control for département of birth by period fixed
effects with λdep(i) and λdep(i),t. This allows to suppress the effect of time-varying
département-level unobservables.
log ferti,d(i),t = β ×Religiosityd(i),late 18th c. +X
′
i,tδ + λdep(i) + λt + λdep(i),t + εi,t
(3)
Table 5 presents our baseline results at the individual level for individuals in the
fertility sample (see Appendix Table 5.1.1 for the full sample). First, we explore the
relationship between late eighteenth century religiosity and fertility after the onset
of the decline in fertility, in 1755. In the first column, with only period fixed effects
and the male dummy, we estimate a large coefficient of .211, significant at the 1%
level. There are 9, 991 couples in 434 districts (84% of all districts in France). In
column (2), we add a quadratic in the age of marriage in order to capture parity-
specific fertility controls and a quadratic in the log fertility of parents to control for
23Periods are defined as half-decades. Results are practically unchanged with year fixed effects instead,
but due to the low number of observations département by year fixed effects would take away most of the
variation in districts with only one observation in a given year.
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broader family-level and ancestral characteristics. We control for district-level pre-
secularization religiosity measures in (3), and for the urban status of the town of birth
in the year of observation and Encyclopedie subscriptions per capita at the district
level in (4). Results are practically unchanged.
In (5), we add département fixed effects in order to capture time-invariant dé-
partement-level characteristics such as state capacity or a shared culture/language for
which there is practically no variation within département. The coefficient on Religios-
ity (late 18th c.) increases substantially, to .298. Eventually, we add département by
period fixed effects in order to control for time-varying département-level characteris-
tics that may confound the effect of late eighteenth century religiosity. Figure 5.1.1,
Panel A, displays the distribution of the independent variable before and after fixed
effects in order to isolate relevant variation in the treatment (see Panel B for the full
sample). We report our results in column (6) of Table 5 and find a larger coefficient,
significant at the 1% level.
Table 5: Determinants of fertility at the individual level
Note: This table displays the results of the individual-level regression of the log total number of children ever born
on late eighteenth century religiosity. Religiosity (late 18th c.) is defined as the share of refractory clergy (non-jurors)
in 1791, at the district of birth level. Individual level controls include a quadratic in the age of marriage and in the log
number of children of the individual’s parents. Religiosity (pre-secularization) controls include the number of abbeys in
1756 and the duration of Jesuit presence until 1763 (both at the district of birth level). Development and Enlightenment
controls include the urban status of the town of birth in the year of observation and the log of Encyclopedie subscriptions
in 1777− 1779 at the district level. All specifications include period fixed effects and a male dummy. We report two-way
clustered standard errors (at the couple and district level). Table 5.1.1 reports the same regressions for the full sample.
Figure 5.1.2 displays the binscatter of specification (6).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: log Number of children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.211*** 0.191*** 0.187*** 0.191*** 0.298*** 0.340*** -0.030
(0.070) (0.058) (0.061) (0.062) (0.109) (0.127) (0.151)
× After transition 0.367*
(0.194)
Sample
Observed after demographic transition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observed between 1700 and 1900 Yes
Controls
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religiosity (pre-secularization) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Development and Enlightenment Yes Yes Yes Yes
Département of birth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Département of birth by period fixed effects Yes Yes
Mean of log fert .95 .95 .95 .95 .95 .95 1
Standard deviation of log fert .82 .82 .82 .82 .82 .82 .84
Perc. 25-75 Religiosity (late 18th c.) .10 .09 .09 .09 .14 .16
Observations (couples) 9,991 9,857 9,857 9,792 9,792 9,792 12,908
Clusters (districts) 434 434 434 432 432 432 451
R-squared 0.02 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.37 0.38
Figure 5.1.2 displays a binscatter plot of the relationship estimated in (6). In both
specifications -(5) and (6)- controlling for département-level unobservables substanti-
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ate our initial insight and the results of the Oster exercise about the direction of the
bias: unobservables bias our estimates downwards, to zero. In a nutshell, we estimate
throughout that an increase in Religiosity (late 18th c.) is predicted to increase log
fertility of .2 to .3, which amounts to an increase in the total number of children
ranging from 1.2 to 1.4 additional child. This is a huge effect as the log fertility of
the average individual was 0.95, about 2.6 children. Finally, we report standardized
estimates and find, again, that secularization (religiosity in the late eighteenth cen-
tury, controlling for pre-secularization religiosity and time-varying département-level
unobservables) accounts for the vast majority of the fertility decline.
We have so far established a large effect of late eighteenth century religiosity after
the onset of the transition, even after controlling for time-varying département-level
unobservables. Controlling for pre-secularization religiosity measures and département
by period fixed effects suggest that we did not capture the effect of pre-existing dif-
ferences in religiosity, but rather the effect of secularization, and that our results are
not driven by unobservables.
In column (7), we test for the sign and significance of the relationship between
Religiosity (late 18th c.) and log of fertility before and after the transition. We
extend the sample to all available years, from 1700 to 1955 and add an interaction
term between Religiosity (late 18th c.) and Aftert, a dummy that equals one if
the individual was observed after the transition (Equation 4). This specification is
essentially a difference in differences, where treatment is the level of religiosity in
the late eighteenth century.24 The coefficient on Religiosity (late 18th c.) alone,
β0, captures the effect of late eighteenth century religiosity on fertility before the
onset of the transition, while the coefficient on the interaction terms, β1, captures
the additional effect after the transition. We expect to find that, after we control for
département-level unobservables, religiosity in the late eighteenth century did not have
an effect on fertility before the arrival of secularization/the demographic transition.
(4)
log ferti,d(i),t = β0Religiosityd(i),late 18th c. + β1AftertReligiosityd(i),late 18th c.
+Aftert +X
′
i,tδ + λdep(i) + λt + λdep(i),t + εi,t
We find that, before the onset of the transition, Religiosity (late 18th c.) had a
null (slightly negative) and statistically insignificant effect on log fertility, while it
had a large, positive, and statistically significant effect in the aftermath of the decline
24In this context however, testing for pre-trends is complex due to data availability (we can only go back
until 1700, and the number of observations is limited), but the fact that there is no effect in 1700 − 1755 is
reassuring and indicates that there was likely no pre-trend. In order to test this, we interact Religiosity (late
18th c.) with linear time trends before and after the transition and find insignificant trends (with a coefficient
close to 0 before 1755), which is suggestive that there was no different pre-trends in départements with high
and with low religiosity in the late eighteenth century. Results available upon demand.
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in fertility. We plot the estimated coefficients in Figure 4. This result is providing
further indication that we do capture a causal effect of secularization, and that we are
not merely capturing pre-existing differences.
Figure 4: Effect of Religiosity (late 18th c.) before and after transition
Note: This figure displays the estimated coefficients on Religiosity (late 18th c.) before and after the transition, from
specification (7) of Table 5. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the couple and at the district level.
Migrants and intergenerationally transmitted cultural traits Last but
not least, we provide an additional test to show that the coefficient on Religiosity
(late 18th c.) does not capture pre-existing differences. We rely on a strategy that is
reminiscent of the epidemiological approach to study the effect of cultural persistence
on development. The epidemiological approach has been widely used to study the
intergenerational transmission of cultural norms and beliefs. While papers using this
approach (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Fernández, 2011; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales,
2004) have demonstrated a high degree of persistence in culture, we rather study
cultural change.25
25Ideally, we would like to use the epidemiological approach to identify the effect of religiosity in the late
eighteenth century on second generation migrants. But this would imply restricting the sample whose parents
were born after 1755 and migrated to a different district. This would very significantly reduce the sample size,
to less than 600 couples. Such procedure, with district of parental origin fixed effects, does return a positive
coefficient .146 that is not statistically significant at standard levels of confidence due to a large standard
error of .332.
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In times of changing cultural norms and social unrest, we expect individuals to
be more likely to change preferences and behaviors. Our approach therefore relies
on first generation migrants, who migrated during childhood.26 We would like to
study individuals who migrated before the change in social norms, but were exposed
to secularization in their district of settlement. That is, in our dataset, with a year
of observation in the second half of the eighteenth century. This would allow us to
identify the effect of cultural change (secularization) separated from pre-secularization
inherited cultural traits (observables and unobservables), by using district of birth
fixed effects.
Thereby, we study the effect of Religiosity (late 18th c.) of the district of marriage
and abstract from observed and unobserved intergenerationally transmitted cultural
traits with district of birth fixed effects. Formally, we estimate Equation 5, for migrant
i who settled in district s(i) and originate from district o(i).
log ferti,s(i),t = β ×Religiositys(i),late 18th c. +X
′
i,s(i),tδ + λt + λo(i) + εi,s(i),t(5)
While our main prediction entails looking only at individuals observed (the year of
observation is the year of marriage) in the very immediate aftermath of the transition,
the number of observations with such a restriction would be very limited. Hence, we
estimate a slightly modified version of this model, with all individuals observed after
1755 and a time trend interacted with Religiosity (late 18th c.) of the district of
marriage. We expect to find that Religiosity (late 18th c.) of the district of marriage
had a positive and significant effect in the first years following 1755.
We present our results in Appendix Table 5.2.1.27 First, we follow the main spec-
ification -(6)- of Table 5, with the independent variables measured at the district of
marriage level instead of district of birth. We find a very similar, slightly higher,
coefficient on Religiosity (late 18th c.) of the district of marriage as compared with
that of the district of birth in Table 5. In Column (2), we replace the département
of marriage fixed effects with district of birth fixed effects, which account for inter-
generationally transmitted cultural traits (both observables and unobservables) such
as religiosity before secularization. The coefficient on Religiosity (late 18th c.) of the
district of marriage is divided by two, with inherited cultural traits capturing about
half of the effect. However, the correlation between religiosity in the late 18th c. at
the district of birth and at the district of marriage levels is high (.91), since most
individuals did not migrate. Therefore, in the following specifications, we restrict the
sample to those who migrated during childhood only. The sample is significantly re-
26An individual is said to have migrated during childhood if it has a place of marriage (proxied by place of
birth of the first child) that is different from its place of birth.
27Table 5.2.2 for the full sample.
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duced, down to 1, 261 couples and 290 districts. First, in column (3), we estimate a
roughly similar, slightly lower, coefficient on Religiosity (late 18th c.) of the district of
marriage (without district of birth fixed effects). In (4), we add again district of birth
fixed effects and find quantitatively similar but not statistically significant results.
Finally, in (5), we test our main prediction by interacting Religiosity (late 18th c.)
of the district of marriage with a time trend (the number of years elapsed since the
onset of the transition in France). We find that, accounting for district of origin fixed
effects, Religiosity (late 18th c.) of the district of marriage has a large and significant
effect at the time of the transition. The effect is comparable in size to that estimated in
our baseline results. The estimated effect decays over time, and becomes statistically
insignificant in the 19th century. We display the estimated coefficient over time in
Appendix Figure 5.2.1. As time passes and cultural change is replaced by persistence,
intergenerational transmission takes over and the district of origin fixed effects likely
capture internalized religious norms and beliefs. For individuals who migrated before
secularization but were exposed to the change in norms in their place of destination,
Religiosity (late 18th c.) of the district of marriage has a large and significant effect.
6 Roots of secularization
We now turn to a description of the roots of the decline in religiosity. If the rapid
process of secularization in eighteenth century France is at the origins of the early
demographic transition, what explains secularization? Although this is not the main
focus of the paper, we provide some elements of answer in this section.
First, we provide a raw empirical evaluation of the extent of religious turmoil in
early eighteenth century France (see Section 2 for a detailed discussion). In Figure
5, we plot the frequency, in percentage, of occurrence of the following 1-grams in
the whole Google Books French corpus from 1700 to 1900: catholic(s) and priest(s).
Given the scarcity of data on religious attitudes in eighteenth century France, this
is the first time the extent of religious turmoil is assessed at the national level. The
pattern emerging from that figure mirrors that at the local level described in Hoffman
(1984); Norberg (1985); Vovelle (1973).28
As a result of religious turmoil and social unrest, “a spirit of irreligion was sweeping
over the kingdom (...) in a veritable flood ” (Tackett, 1986, p. 252). We already
presented a host of historical anecdotes and narratives suggesting that the Counter
Reformation played a major role in the decline: “the Counter Reformation’s austere
morality was imposed in full force (...) not surprisingly, it was rejected by people who
saw nothing wrong in combining devotion and gaiety” (Hoffman, 1984, p. 138).
28The same figure for the British English corpus leads a much lower and flatter curve, with less variance.
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Figure 5: Religious turmoil in eighteenth century France
Note: This figure displays the frequency of occurrence of catholic(s) and priest(s) 1-grams in the Google Books French
corpus from 1700 to 1900. Results are case-insensitives. We display moving averages over 3 years.
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In the rest of Europe, Protestantism spread and secularization came as a gradual
process. In Germany, this was the result of religious competition between Catholics
and Protestants: as Protestants confronted the monopoly of the Catholic Church,
their need to strike bargains with the secular elites affect the market for political
legitimacy in favor of secular rulers (Cantoni, Dittmar and Yuchtman, 2018).
In France, this is a whole different story. In the late sixteenth century, the Edict
of Nantes (1598) granted French (Calvinist) Protestants, the Huguenots, the right
to practice their religion without persecution. However, the Edict of Fontainebleau
ended this short period of religious toleration and freedom in 1685. The edict, issued
by Louis XIV, deprived Protestants of all religious and civil liberties, and ordered the
destruction of Huguenots churches. Dragonnades, French policies of legal persecution
and forced conversion of Protestants ordered by Louis XIV, embodied the fight and
terror against the Protestant Reformation. French dragoons, infantry soldiers, were
billeted to Huguenots households in order to harass and intimidate them (Figure 6.0.1
displays a 1686 engraving representing the dragonnades). As a result most Protes-
tants left France, which set the course for the unchecked diffusion of the Counter
Reformation in France.
Especially while Jesuits had long been praised by the elites, Jansenism, a pious,
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austere, and rigorist theological movement unique to France, spread (Chartier, 1991;
Van Kley, 1996). Tackett (1986) writes that “during the first half of the eighteenth
century, one issue in diocesan politics dominated all others: the issue of Jansenism”
(p. 128). The austerity and rigorism of Jansenists is believed to have played a major
role, but why? Our hypothesis is that the coercive monopoly of the Catholic Church
on the market for salvation in France led the Counter Reformation, and especially
Jansenists, to charge a price that excluded most faithful. Consistent with that, there
is widespread evidence that Jansenist priests, or priests in Jansenist dioceses, widely
supported the oath (Préclin, 1929).
In this section, we provide the first empirical evaluation of the hypothesis that the
spread of the Counter Reformation in France resulted in a rapid process of seculariza-
tion in the 1750’s and in the rise of strong anti-clerical beliefs. According to Braudel
(1986b) “The drama played out in the eighteenth century was a sort of revenge on
the part of the Reformation. Having hesitated, two centuries earlier, between Rome
and Luther, or rather between Rome and Calvin, France had chosen Rome, but the
choice backfired.” (p. 200). Therefore, we digitize diocese-level data on the spread of
Jansenism and test the sign of the relationship with religiosity in the late eighteenth
century (also measured at the diocese level). We expect places with more Jansenists
to be less religious in the late eighteenth century, with social unrest developing as
a result of jansenist rigorism and the dearth of alternative. Formally, we estimate
Equation 6, at the diocese d level.
Religiosityd,late 18th c. = β × log 1 + Jansenistsd,1716−1725 +X ′dδ + εd(6)
The number of Jansenists in a diocese is proxied by the number of appelants in 1716
to 1725 (from Préclin (1929)), clergy members who appealed to a general council to
protest the Unigenitus papal bull, the 1713 apostolic constitution against Jansenism.
We provide summary statistics in Table 6.0.1 and display maps of variables of interests
in Figure 6.0.2.29 The spatial distribution of Jansenism and of religiosity in the late
eighteenth century exhibit surprisingly similar patterns, with a correlation coefficient
of −.23. To emphasize this, Tackett (1986) writes that “In the greater Parisian Basin,
Jansenism would wield considerable influence over both the rural and the urban clergy.
In Brittany, by contrast, it would seem to have been overwhelmingly concentrated in a
few towns and to have been rapidly repressed ” (p. 132).
Table 6 reports our results. All observations are weighed by diocese population in
order to capture the effect on the religiosity of the average Frenchman in the late
29There are 133 dioceses in France in 1791. We generate diocese boundaries with Thiessen polygons. Also,
we use the log of the number of Jansenists because some places had more than 1, 000 appelants.
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eighteenth century. In column (1), without controls, we estimate that an increase in
log 1 + Jansenists is associated with a decrease in Religiosity (late 18th c.) of 2.8
percentage points. The effect is statistically significant at the 5% level, and economi-
cally large. We report standardized statistics and find that moving from the 25th to
the 75th percentile of the distribution of Jansenists is predicted to decrease religiosity
in the late 18th c. of 10 percentage point, about 40% of a standard deviation. In
column (2), we control for pre-secularization religiosity measures. Column (3) controls
for region fixed effects to abstract from unobserved characteristics such as the use of
a shared language or local culture. In column (4), we further control for Encyclopedie
subscriptions at the diocese level and pays status dummies, to capture unobserved
institutional characteristics in the Ancien Régime. Finally, in columns (5) and (6),
we control for pre-industrial and contemporary development proxies with population
and the rate of urbanization in 1793.
Our estimates are large, stable, and significant across specification. Moreover, since
Jansenism spread mostly in the greater Parisian Basin and in the Rhone valley, we
expect our coefficients to be confounded by development and therefore to be biased
towards zero.30 Indeed, we found that the magnitude of the coefficient increases in
column (5) and (6), after the inclusion of development proxies.
Table 6: Counter-reformation and secularization
Note: This table displays the results of the cross-sectional regression of religiosity in the late eighteenth century on
the presence of Jansenist clergymen, at the diocese level. Religiosity (late 18th c.) is defined as the share of refractory
clergy (non-jurors) in 1791. Religiosity (pre-secularization) controls include the average exposure to département-level
clergymen in 1791, the number of abbeys in 1756, and centuries of Jesuit presence before 1763. Cultural and institutional
factors include Encyclopedie subscriptions per 10, 000 inhabitants and pays dummies. Pre-industrial and contemporary
development include, respectively, population and the log of urbanization in 1793. All observations are weighed by dio-
cese population in 1793. We report robust standard errors.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: Religiosity (late 18th c.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log 1 + Jansenists (1716-1725) -0.028** -0.030*** -0.028** -0.025** -0.026** -0.027**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Religiosity (pre-secularization) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cultural and institutional factors Yes Yes Yes
Pre-industrial development Yes Yes
Contemporary development Yes
Mean of Religiosity (late 18th c.) .47 .47 .47 .47 .47 .47
Standard deviation of Religiosity (late 18th c.) .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26
Perc. 25-75 log 1 + Jansenists -.10 -.11 -.10 -.09 -.09 -.10
Observations 122 121 121 121 121 121
R-squared 0.05 0.15 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.46
Finally we test whether the presence of Jansenists had a larger effect on religiosity
30This spatial diffusion pattern probably is the result of the center of Jansenism in France being in the
Abbey of Port Royal des Champs, 50 kilometers away from Paris.
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in the late eighteenth century in places where they could compete with Jesuits. This
hypothesis has been advanced in the history literature as a plausible explanation to
the decline (Van Kley, 1996). We interact log 1+Jansenists with the duration of Je-
suit presence (in centuries) in a diocese. This way, we can test whether it was religious
competition between Jansenists and Jesuits or rather the absence of religious compe-
tition with Protestants that is at the origins of secularization. Appendix Figure 6.0.3
reports marginal effects of log 1 + Jansenists, with and without region fixed effects.
In both cases, due to large standard errors, we fail to reject the null that Jansenists
did not lead to secularization in the absence of Jesuits. However, the coefficient is
mostly flat, which indicates that Jansenists were a sufficient condition for religiosity
to decline, and competition with Jesuits did not play a significant role contrary to
what was believed by Tackett (1986); Van Kley (1996). It is likely that global com-
petition with Jesuits played a role in driving Jansenists to propose a rigorist, pious,
and austere alternative, but we are unable to support this.
Our estimates suggest that it seems to be the case that the coercive monopoly of the
Catholic Church on the market for salvation in France led the Counter Reformation,
and especially Jansenists, to charge a price that led to the exclusion of most faithful.
This would explain the religious turmoil and decline in religious attitudes that affected
France in the eighteenth century.
7 Concluding remarks
This research is the first to both advance the hypothesis and establish that seculariza-
tion brought about the demographic transition in France. Our analysis was motivated
by the remarkably early timing of the decline in fertility in France, more than a hun-
dred years before the rest of Europe and in a period of stagnation. However, this
paper is not only about the causes of the demographic transition, but also and more
importantly about, broadly, the role of ideas, preferences, and culture in shaping de-
velopment. Our results suggest that cultural change and preferences matter in the
process of development.31 In particular, we establish that the transition from tradition
to modernity played a role in the transition from stagnation to growth.
We have demonstrated that the important, early, and sudden process of secular-
ization in mid-eighteenth century France brought about the decline in fertility and
accounts for most of the demographic transition. Throughout the paper, we have esti-
mated particularly large, robust, and significant results across specifications, datasets,
and estimation methods. The features of the process of secularization in France sug-
gest that we captured the causal effect of religiosity in the late eighteenth century.
31In a sense, this echoes the work of Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) on the role of luck and multiple
equilibria and Galor and Moav (2002) on the role of preferences and human (cultural and/or genetic) evolution.
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Moreover, with individual-level data in the eighteenth century we have been able to
study, for the first time, the determinants of fertility in France at the time of and be-
fore the decline. Our results at the individual level suggest that secularization caused
the demographic transition. Finally, we have provided some elements that can explain
the idiosyncratic and early process of secularization in eighteenth century France. We
have found suggestive evidence that the monopoly of the Roman Catholic Church and
the spread of the Counter Reformation in France caused strong religious turmoil and
declining religious beliefs.
In future research, it would be interesting to explore the short and long run conse-
quences of the decline in religiosity on political outcomes and democratization. There
is strong evidence that the process of secularization had wide ranging consequences
and also brought about the French Revolution: “If the Revolution could, with an as-
tonishing facility, destroy the throne and the altar, it is because Jansenism, for more
than a century, had destroyed the foundations of both.” (Van Kley, 1996, p. 505).32
32Again, this is not a concern in our analysis because we use the share of refractory clergy in 1791 only,
before the major events of the French Revolution.
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Appendix 3− The data
3.1 Religiosity
Table 3.1.1: Correlation matrix (Religiosity and development)
Note: This table present correlations between late 18th c. religiosity, pre-secularization religiosity proxies, and development
proxies at the département level. All observations are weighed by département population in 1793.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Religiosity (late 18th c.) 1.000
(2) Clergymen per 10,000 inhabitants (1791) -0.047 1.000
(3) Abbeys (1756) 0.029 0.292∗∗∗ 1.000
(4) Tithe (1750) -0.170 -0.230∗∗ 0.117 1.000
(5) Huguenots per 10,000 inhabitants (1815) 0.082 -0.102 -0.044 -0.050 1.000
(6) Centuries of Jesuit presence (bef. 1763) 0.041 -0.149 0.108 -0.028 -0.210∗ 1.000
(7) log 1 + Encyclopedie sub. per 10,000 inhabitants (1777-1779) 0.022 -0.123 -0.019 0.067 0.168 0.257∗∗ 1.000
(8) Literacy (1790) 0.002 0.178 -0.007 -0.032 -0.009 0.106 0.104 1.000
(9) log Urbanization (1793) 0.260∗∗ -0.206∗ -0.007 -0.055 0.071 0.133 0.438∗∗∗ 0.198∗ 1.000
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.2 Département level
Table 3.2.1: Summary statistics at the département level
Note: All observations weighed by population in 1793.
Mean St. dev. Minimum Maximum N
Panel A: Fertility
Marital fertility index Ig (1831) 0.56 0.12 0.35 0.81 77
Marital fertility index Ig (1836) 0.54 0.11 0.33 0.78 77
Marital fertility index Ig (1841) 0.52 0.11 0.32 0.76 77
Marital fertility index Ig (1846) 0.51 0.11 0.31 0.73 77
Marital fertility index Ig (1851) 0.49 0.11 0.30 0.75 85
Marital fertility index Ig (1856) 0.49 0.11 0.29 0.74 85
Marital fertility index Ig (1861) 0.49 0.12 0.28 0.78 88
Marital fertility index Ig (1866) 0.49 0.13 0.28 0.77 88
Marital fertility index Ig (1871) 0.49 0.13 0.28 0.81 86
Marital fertility index Ig (1876) 0.48 0.14 0.27 0.84 86
Marital fertility index Ig (1881) 0.48 0.14 0.27 0.82 86
Marital fertility index Ig (1886) 0.45 0.13 0.25 0.80 86
Marital fertility index Ig (1891) 0.43 0.12 0.23 0.77 86
Marital fertility index Ig (1896) 0.41 0.12 0.23 0.74 86
Marital fertility index Ig (1901) 0.40 0.11 0.23 0.72 86
Marital fertility index Ig (1921) 0.34 0.07 0.21 0.54 89
Marital fertility index Ig (1931) 0.30 0.06 0.18 0.45 89
Marital fertility index Ig (1961) 0.33 0.04 0.23 0.40 89
Panel B: Religiosity
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.49 0.22 0.08 0.90 85
Tithe (1750) 15.61 6.39 9.00 40.00 87
Abbeys (1756) 2.52 2.37 0.00 13.00 89
Centuries of Jesuit presence (bef. 1763) 1.26 0.69 0.00 2.02 89
Clergymen per 10,000 inhabitants (1791) 19.07 6.75 3.30 41.23 84
Huguenots per 10,000 inhabitants (1815) 167.15 443.76 0.16 3424.00 83
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Share of Jansenist clergymen (1725) 0.15 0.67 0.00 4.05 84
Panel C: Cultural and institutional factors
Books printed (1500) 140.87 583.43 0.00 3264.00 85
Presence of a printing press (1500) 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 85
Presence of a university (bef. 1750) 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 85
log 1 + Encyclopedie sub. per 10,000 inhabitants (1777-1779) 0.96 0.76 0.00 3.52 86
Pays d’Etat 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 89
Pays d’imposition 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 89
Panel D: Education and schooling
Literacy (1790) 34.04 19.72 3.46 78.88 88
Literacy (1840) 56.55 20.14 18.40 97.10 88
Literacy (1860) 69.10 17.02 32.10 96.10 88
Literacy (1865) 73.36 15.59 37.90 97.00 88
Literacy (1881) 86.58 8.86 58.60 98.50 85
Literacy (1896) 94.93 4.21 80.60 99.70 85
Panel E: Pre-industrial development
Average soldier height (1716-1749) -0 1 -3 3 85
Département population (1793) 353,555 139,347 36,000 748,030 89
Département population (1841) 443,038 198,335 52,364 1,114,788 87
Département population (1861) 494,149 322,159 55,551 2,004,490 88
Département population (1866) 500,334 357,101 56,127 2,207,445 89
Département population (1881) 532,002 460,649 73,347 2,865,982 89
Département population (1901) 568,526 613,202 91,128 3,777,679 89
Panel F: Contemporary development
Urbanization (1793) 0.18 0.16 0.02 0.86 86
Urbanization (1841) 0.19 0.16 0.02 0.88 87
Urbanization (1861) 0.23 0.17 0.04 0.93 88
Urbanization (1866) 0.23 0.17 0.04 0.94 88
Urbanization (1881) 0.26 0.18 0.05 0.96 89
Urbanization (1901) 0.30 0.18 0.05 0.97 89
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Table 3.2.2: Control variables
Note: This table displays the control variables used throughout in Section 4.
Specification Variable Source
(2) Religiosity (pre-secularization)
Clergymen per 10, 000 inhabitant (1792) Tackett (1986)
Tithe (1750) Marion (1912)
Huguenots per 10, 000 inhabitant (1815) Mours (1958)
Centuries of Jesuit presence (bef. 1763) Grendler (2017)
Abbeys (1756) BDCassini (2017); Franck and
Michalopoulos (2017)
(4) Cultural and institutional factors
Presence of a printing press (1500) Clair (1976); Febvre and Martin (1958)
Books printed (1500) ISTC (2008)
log 1 + Encyclopedie sub. per 10,000 inhab. (1777-1779) Darnton (1973)
Dummies for Pays status (Election, Etat, Imposition) Wikipedia
Presence of a university (bef. 1750) Darby and Fullard (1970); Jedin, La-
tourette and Martin (1970)
(5) Education and schooling
Literacy rate (year of observation) SGF (1878)
(6) Pre-industrial development
Population of department (year of observation) BDCassini (2017)
Average soldier height (1716− 1749) Komlos (2006)
(7) Contemporary development
Urbanization rate (year of observation) BDCassini (2017)
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Figure 3.2.1: Maps
Note: This figure displays the spatial distribution of some variables of interest.
(Panel A) Clergymen per 10, 000
inhabitants (1791)
(Panel B) Abbeys (1756) (Panel C) Tithe (1750)
(Panel D) Years of jesuit presence (before
1763)
(Panel E) Huguenots per 10, 000
inhabitants (1815)
(Panel F) log 1 + Encyclopedie sub. per
10,000 inhabitants (1776)
(Panel G) Literacy (1790) (Panel H) Urbanization (1793)
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3.3 Individual level
Table 3.3.1: Summary statistics at the individual and district levels
Mean St. dev. Minimum Maximum N
Panel A: Fertility
Number of children 3.85 3.23 1.00 36.00 18,663
Fertility of parents 4.65 3.44 1.00 28.50 18,663
Age at birth of first child 29.17 6.93 15.00 65.00 17,941
Panel B: Religiosity (district level)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.59 0.88 0.00 1.00 453
Abbeys (1756) 0.44 1.74 0.00 7.00 454
Centuries of Jesuit presence (bef. 1763) 0.54 2.23 0.00 2.01 454
Panel C: Development and Enlightenment (town and district level)
Urbanization (year of observation) 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 2,673
log 1 + Encyclopedie sub. per 10,000 inhabitants (1777-1779) 0.58 2.45 0.00 5.55 452
Figure 3.3.1: Districts
Note: This figure displays administrative boundaries (départements and districts) and towns used in the individual level
dataset. The fertility sample consists in all individuals with a recorded horizontal lineage, while the main sample consists in all
other individuals with a recorded rate of fertility plus those in the fertility sample. Our main measure of interest in unavailable
in the départements in white.
(Panel A) Towns of birth in fertility sample (Panel B) District-level religiosity
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Appendix 4− Main empirical findings at the département level
4.1 Baseline results
Table 4.1.1: Determinants of Ig
Note: This table displays the results of the same regression as in Table 1, at different points in time from 1831 to 1901.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1841
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.257*** 0.254*** 0.257*** 0.269*** 0.269*** 0.265*** 0.268***
(0.054) (0.048) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.068) (0.071)
Religiosity (pre-secularization) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cultural and institutional factors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education and schooling Yes Yes Yes
Pre-industrial development Yes Yes
Contemporary development Yes
Mean of Ig (1841) .52 .52 .52 .52 .52 .52 .52
Standard deviation of Ig (1841) .11 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10
Perc. 25-75 Religiosity (late 18th c.) .10 .09 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10
Observations 76 73 73 73 73 73 73
R-squared 0.27 0.41 0.62 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
(Panel A) 1841
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1861
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.315*** 0.326*** 0.350*** 0.325*** 0.324*** 0.322*** 0.309***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.069) (0.071)
Religiosity (pre-secularization) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cultural and institutional factors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education and schooling Yes Yes Yes
Pre-industrial development Yes Yes
Contemporary development Yes
Mean of Ig (1861) .49 .48 .48 .48 .48 .48 .48
Standard deviation of Ig (1861) .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12
Perc. 25-75 Religiosity (late 18th c.) .12 .12 .13 .12 .12 .12 .11
Observations 83 79 79 79 79 79 79
R-squared 0.31 0.36 0.63 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.79
(Panel B) 1861
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1881
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.374*** 0.373*** 0.347*** 0.337*** 0.335*** 0.320*** 0.320***
(0.061) (0.057) (0.073) (0.070) (0.071) (0.079) (0.078)
Religiosity (pre-secularization) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cultural and institutional factors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education and schooling Yes Yes Yes
Pre-industrial development Yes Yes
Contemporary development Yes
Mean of Ig (1881) .47 .46 .46 .46 .46 .46 .46
Standard deviation of Ig (1881) .13 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12
Perc. 25-75 Religiosity (late 18th c.) .14 .14 .13 .13 .12 .12 .12
Observations 82 77 77 77 77 77 77
R-squared 0.37 0.47 0.65 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77
(Panel C) 1881
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1901
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.304*** 0.309*** 0.268*** 0.250*** 0.245*** 0.253*** 0.254***
(0.054) (0.049) (0.057) (0.053) (0.053) (0.061) (0.060)
Religiosity (pre-secularization) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cultural and institutional factors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education and schooling Yes Yes Yes
Pre-industrial development Yes Yes
Contemporary development Yes
Mean of Ig (1901) .39 .39 .39 .39 .39 .39 .39
Standard deviation of Ig (1901) .10 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10
Perc. 25-75 Religiosity (late 18th c.) .11 .11 .10 .09 .09 .09 .09
Observations 82 77 77 77 77 77 77
R-squared 0.33 0.52 0.70 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83
(Panel D) 1901
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Figure 4.1.1: Determinants of Ig (scatterplot, uncontrolled)
Note: This Figure displays the results of the same regression as in specification (1) in Table 4.1.1.
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Figure 4.1.2: Determinants of Ig (scatterplot, with controls)
Note: This Figure displays the results of the same regression as in specification (7) in Table 4.1.1.
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4.2 Accounting for spatial dependence
Table 4.2.1: Accounting for spatial dependance in the determinants of Ig
Note: This table displays the results of the same regression as in Table 3, at different points in time from 1831 to 1901.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1841
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Testing spatial correlation on OLS residuals
Assumption 1: 250 kilometers correlation range ; 2: 500 kms (in parenthesis)
p-val of Moran’s test for spatial
dependence (H0: error is iid) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .99 (.86) .69 (.61) .70 (.62) .72 (.62) .70 (.62)
Fraction of simulations with
significant (p=.001) spatial noise 4% (2%) 5% (4%) 2% (2%) 0% (0%) 0% (0%) 0% (0%) 0% (0%)
Fraction of simulations where independent
variable explains (p=.001) noise 8% (8%) 7% (10%) 2% (1%) 1% (0%) 1% (0%) 1% (0%) 1% (0%)
Panel B: Spatial correlation-adjusted standard errors
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.257 0.254 0.257 0.269 0.269 0.265 0.268
Non-adjusted standard errors (0.049)*** (0.048)*** (0.062)*** (0.058)*** (0.058)*** (0.062)*** (0.063)***
Conley standard errors (Assumption 1) 〈0.081〉*** 〈0.062〉*** 〈0.058〉*** 〈0.048〉*** 〈0.047〉*** 〈0.046〉*** 〈0.048〉***
Conley standard errors (Assumption 2) [0.091]*** [0.066]*** [0.042]*** [0.032]*** [0.031]*** [0.028]*** [0.031]***
(Panel A) 1841
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1861
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Testing spatial correlation on OLS residuals
Assumption 1: 250 kilometers correlation range ; 2: 500 kms (in parenthesis)
p-val of Moran’s test for spatial
dependence (H0: error is iid) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .67 (.96) .83 (.82) .85 (.88) .95 (.71) .97 (.69)
Fraction of simulations with
significant (p=.001) spatial noise 10% (11%) 14% (10%) 7% (5%) 1% (0%) 1% (0%) 1% (0%) 1% (0%)
Fraction of simulations where independent
variable explains (p=.001) noise 12% (10%) 10% (11%) 4% (2%) 3% (1%) 3% (1%) 4% (2%) 2% (1%)
Panel B: Spatial correlation-adjusted standard errors
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.315 0.326 0.350 0.325 0.324 0.322 0.309
Non-adjusted standard errors (0.052)*** (0.055)*** (0.065)*** (0.057)*** (0.057)*** (0.059)*** (0.060)***
Conley standard errors (Assumption 1) 〈0.078〉*** 〈0.074〉*** 〈0.073〉*** 〈0.053〉*** 〈0.053〉*** 〈0.058〉*** 〈0.061〉***
Conley standard errors (Assumption 2) [0.089]*** [0.083]*** [0.068]*** [0.041]*** [0.042]*** [0.048]*** [0.048]***
(Panel B) 1861
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1881
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Testing spatial correlation on OLS residuals
Assumption 1: 250 kilometers correlation range ; 2: 500 kms (in parenthesis)
p-val of Moran’s test for spatial
dependence (H0: error is iid) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .87 (.76) .89 (.71) .89 (.73) .79 (.57) .79 (.57)
Fraction of simulations with
significant (p=.001) spatial noise 10% (10%) 7% (8%) 3% (2%) 1% (0%) 1% (0%) 1% (0%) 1% (0%)
Fraction of simulations where independent
variable explains (p=.001) noise 8% (11%) 8% (12%) 2% (1%) 1% (0%) 1% (0%) 2% (1%) 2% (1%)
Panel B: Spatial correlation-adjusted standard errors
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.374 0.373 0.347 0.337 0.335 0.320 0.320
Non-adjusted standard errors (0.055)*** (0.054)*** (0.072)*** (0.067)*** (0.067)*** (0.071)*** (0.071)***
Conley standard errors (Assumption 1) 〈0.092〉*** 〈0.071〉*** 〈0.069〉*** 〈0.051〉*** 〈0.051〉*** 〈0.048〉*** 〈0.047〉***
Conley standard errors (Assumption 2) [0.104]*** [0.077]*** [0.052]*** [0.038]*** [0.038]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]***
(Panel C) 1881
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1901
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Testing spatial correlation on OLS residuals
Assumption 1: 250 kilometers correlation range ; 2: 500 kms (in parenthesis)
p-val of Moran’s test for spatial
dependence (H0: error is iid) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .90 (.81) .95 (.77) .95 (.79) .79 (.57) .74 (.54)
Fraction of simulations with
significant (p=.001) spatial noise 8% (11%) 5% (8%) 2% (1%) 0% (0%) 0% (0%) 0% (0%) 0% (0%)
Fraction of simulations where independent
variable explains (p=.001) noise 8% (12%) 8% (12%) 2% (1%) 1% (0%) 1% (0%) 2% (1%) 2% (1%)
Panel B: Spatial correlation-adjusted standard errors
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.304 0.309 0.268 0.250 0.245 0.253 0.254
Non-adjusted standard errors (0.049)*** (0.044)*** (0.059)*** (0.051)*** (0.051)*** (0.054)*** (0.055)***
Conley standard errors (Assumption 1) 〈0.078〉*** 〈0.058〉*** 〈0.050〉*** 〈0.039〉*** 〈0.039〉*** 〈0.033〉*** 〈0.032〉***
Conley standard errors (Assumption 2) [0.088]*** [0.062]*** [0.037]*** [0.036]*** [0.036]*** [0.025]*** [0.024]***
(Panel D) 1901
Table 4.2.2: Accounting for spatial dependance in the determinants of transition date (Ig < .5)
Note: This table displays the results of the same regression as in Table 3, using the first year with Ig < .5 as a dependent
variable.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: First year with fertility index Ig lower than .5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Testing spatial correlation on OLS residuals
Assumption 1: 250 kilometers correlation range ; 2: 500 kms (in parenthesis)
p-val of Moran’s test for spatial
dependence (H0: error is iid) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .67 (.96) .87 (.77) .87 (.80) .95 (.65) .84 (.59)
Fraction of simulations with
significant (p=.001) spatial noise 6% (4%) 6% (6%) 5% (3%) 0% (0%) 0% (0%) 0% (0%) 1% (0%)
Fraction of simulations where independent
variable explains (p=.001) noise 8% (8%) 8% (11%) 4% (2%) 3% (2%) 3% (2%) 2% (2%) 2% (1%)
Panel B: Spatial correlation-adjusted standard errors
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 98.112 99.647 120.262 111.710 112.670 117.506 118.735
Non-adjusted standard errors (13.224)*** (13.899)*** (17.710)*** (16.195)*** (15.930)*** (16.296)*** (16.922)***
Conley standard errors (Assumption 1) 〈18.969〉*** 〈16.189〉*** 〈18.659〉*** 〈14.255〉*** 〈14.693〉*** 〈14.999〉*** 〈14.658〉***
Conley standard errors (Assumption 2) [20.787]*** [16.858]*** [14.172]*** [10.839]*** [10.203]*** [9.787]*** [9.562]***
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4.3 Accounting for omitted variables
Table 4.3.1: Determinants of Ig (1866) under selection on unobservables
Note: This table displays the estimation of the cross-sectional regression of the marital fertility index Ig in 1866 on late eighteenth century religiosity. Religios-
ity (late 18th c.) is defined as the share of refractory clergy (non-jurors) in 1791. Controls are described in Appendix Table 3.2.2. All observations are weighed by
département population in the year of observation. We model unobservables selection à la Oster (2016). We set R2max = min{1.3R2, .9} and δ = 1 to construct
bounds on the treatment effect and report bootstrapped standard errors on 1, 000 replications. We drop replications with multiple equilibria and in which the es-
timated betas (with and without controls) are not statistically different from one another and the chosen solution is more distant than the alternative solution to
the standard OLS. Appendix Tables 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 display the same set of results at different points in time, and for the determinants of transition year.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1866
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Assumption A: Unobservable selection prop. to observable; B: ∝ diffusion of Enlightenment
Religiosity (late 18th c.)
Oster’s β: βA . 0.401*** 0.457*** 0.342*** 0.338*** 0.334*** 0.325***
(0.083) (0.171) (0.104) (0.107) (0.114) (0.117)
Oster’s β: βB . . . 0.338*** 0.350*** 0.347*** 0.310***
(0.099) (0.100) (0.104) (0.105)
Religiosity (pre-secularization) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cultural and institutional factors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education and schooling Yes Yes Yes
Pre-industrial development Yes Yes
Contemporary development Yes
Oster’s δ: δA . 10.78 1.41 2.08 2.07 2.03 1.99
Oster’s δ: δB . . . 24.67 -12.54 -15.03 7.18
Max R-squared 0.46 0.53 0.85 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Table 4.3.2: Determinants of Ig under selection on unobservables
Note: This table displays the results of the same regression as in Table 4.3.1, at different points in time from 1831 to 1901.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1841
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Assumption A: Unobservable selection prop. to observable; B: ∝ diffusion of Enlightenment
Religiosity (late 18th c.)
Oster’s β: βA . 0.263*** 0.288* 0.298** 0.297** 0.296** 0.302**
(0.060) (0.154) (0.126) (0.130) (0.145) (0.144)
Oster’s β: βB . . . 0.270** 0.272** 0.273** 0.266**
(0.109) (0.110) (0.118) (0.120)
Oster’s δ: δA . -355.53 1.64 2.05 2.05 1.84 1.86
Oster’s δ: δB . . . -176.33 -37.85 -22.24 65.72
Max R-squared 0.35 0.54 0.81 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
(Panel A) 1841
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1861
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Assumption A: Unobservable selection prop. to observable; B: ∝ diffusion of Enlightenment
Religiosity (late 18th c.)
Oster’s β: βA . 0.359*** 0.431*** 0.336*** 0.335*** 0.331*** 0.309**
(0.078) (0.151) (0.112) (0.115) (0.120) (0.120)
Oster’s β: βB . . . 0.321*** 0.343*** 0.342*** 0.295***
(0.107) (0.108) (0.112) (0.112)
Oster’s δ: δA . 8.79 1.54 2.11 2.08 1.98 1.97
Oster’s δ: δB . . . 37.06 -6.57 -6.99 11.20
Max R-squared 0.41 0.47 0.82 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
(Panel B) 1861
Appendix - Page 10
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1881
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Assumption A: Unobservable selection prop. to observable; B: ∝ diffusion of Enlightenment
Religiosity (late 18th c.)
Oster’s β: βA . 0.398*** 0.330 0.320* 0.314** 0.275 0.276
(0.083) (0.264) (0.168) (0.160) (0.175) (0.188)
Oster’s β: βB . . . 0.390*** 0.410*** 0.447*** 0.441***
(0.127) (0.136) (0.148) (0.148)
Oster’s δ: δA . -13.79 1.30 1.68 1.69 1.51 1.52
Oster’s δ: δB . . . -2.23 -1.54 -0.85 -1.14
Max R-squared 0.48 0.61 0.84 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
(Panel C) 1881
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1901
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Assumption A: Unobservable selection prop. to observable; B: ∝ diffusion of Enlightenment
Religiosity (late 18th c.)
Oster’s β: βA . 0.327*** 0.240 0.238** 0.232*** 0.240** 0.242**
(0.067) (0.238) (0.094) (0.088) (0.103) (0.110)
Oster’s β: βB . . . 0.286*** 0.292*** 0.323*** 0.336***
(0.086) (0.091) (0.099) (0.107)
Oster’s δ: δA . -7.09 1.54 2.51 2.61 2.33 2.31
Oster’s δ: δB . . . -1.63 -0.92 -0.47 -0.54
Max R-squared 0.43 0.68 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
(Panel D) 1901
Table 4.3.3: Determinants of transition date (Ig < .5) under selection on unobservables
Note: This table displays the results of the same regression as in Table 4.3.1, using the first year with Ig < .5 as a depen-
dent variable.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: First year with fertility index Ig lower than .5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Assumption A: Unobservable selection prop. to observable; B: ∝ diffusion of Enlightenment
Religiosity (late 18th c.)
Oster’s β: βA . 108.662*** 177.851*** 137.266*** 134.729*** 144.025*** 146.608***
(23.231) (46.744) (40.275) (34.530) (33.140) (35.575)
Oster’s β: βB . . . 103.413*** 108.968*** 116.009*** 110.576***
(37.187) (30.701) (30.675) (33.766)
Oster’s δ: δA . 5.25 1.16 1.51 1.60 1.55 1.54
Oster’s δ: δB . . . 7.06 14.17 37.46 6.57
Max R-squared 0.52 0.58 0.80 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
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4.4 Mechanisms and alternative explanations
Table 4.4.1: Mechanisms and alternative explanations: determinants of Ig
Note: This table displays the results of the same regression as in Table 4, at different points in time from 1841 to 1901.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1841
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.242*** 0.269*** 0.357 0.265*** 0.319*** 0.252***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.262) (0.068) (0.112) (0.074)
Panel A: Development
Population density (1841) 0.002** 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log Urbanization (1841) -0.016 -0.018 -0.005 -0.015
(0.035) (0.029) (0.046) (0.028)
× Religiosity (late 18th c.) -0.033
(0.098)
Panel B: Enlightenment
log 1 + SubEnc (1777-1779) -0.060*** -0.056*** -0.027 -0.053***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.051) (0.019)
× Religiosity (late 18th c.) -0.056
(0.093)
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 74 73 74 73 73 74 73 73 73
R-squared 0.63 0.71 0.59 0.70 0.70 0.65 0.75 0.75 0.77
(Panel A) 1841
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1861
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.291*** 0.314*** 0.319 0.322*** 0.395*** 0.285***
(0.073) (0.078) (0.329) (0.069) (0.081) (0.075)
Panel A: Development
Population density (1861) -0.000** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log Urbanization (1861) 0.028 0.003 0.003 0.019
(0.034) (0.030) (0.059) (0.033)
× Religiosity (late 18th c.) -0.002
(0.117)
Panel B: Enlightenment
log 1 + SubEnc (1777-1779) -0.049** -0.048*** 0.003 -0.054***
(0.022) (0.015) (0.042) (0.016)
× Religiosity (late 18th c.) -0.096
(0.074)
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 80 79 80 79 79 80 79 79 79
R-squared 0.66 0.75 0.63 0.75 0.75 0.66 0.78 0.79 0.79
(Panel B) 1861
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1881
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.301*** 0.297*** 0.533 0.320*** 0.311** 0.314***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.379) (0.079) (0.129) (0.082)
Panel A: Development
Population density (1881) -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log Urbanization (1881) -0.012 -0.013 0.023 0.010
(0.037) (0.033) (0.076) (0.046)
× Religiosity (late 18th c.) -0.078
(0.126)
Panel B: Enlightenment
log 1 + SubEnc (1777-1779) -0.036 -0.045** -0.050 -0.052**
(0.027) (0.022) (0.049) (0.024)
× Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.009
(0.099)
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 78 77 78 77 77 78 77 77 77
R-squared 0.66 0.74 0.66 0.74 0.75 0.67 0.77 0.77 0.77
(Panel C) 1881
dep var: Fertility index Ig 1901
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.242*** 0.228*** 0.656* 0.253*** 0.284*** 0.254***
(0.062) (0.059) (0.340) (0.061) (0.094) (0.066)
Panel A: Development
Population density (1901) -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log Urbanization (1901) -0.025 -0.023 0.042 0.009
(0.030) (0.027) (0.057) (0.033)
× Religiosity (late 18th c.) -0.133
(0.102)
Panel B: Enlightenment
log 1 + SubEnc (1777-1779) -0.029 -0.038** -0.021 -0.040**
(0.018) (0.015) (0.035) (0.018)
× Religiosity (late 18th c.) -0.033
(0.071)
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 78 77 78 77 77 78 77 77 77
R-squared 0.74 0.81 0.75 0.81 0.82 0.76 0.83 0.83 0.83
(Panel D) 1901
Table 4.4.2: Mechanisms and alternative explanations: determinants of transition date (Ig < .5)
Note: This table displays the results of the same regression as in Table 4, using the first year with Ig < .5 as a dependent
variable.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: First year with fertility index Ig lower than .5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 120.460*** 121.098*** 194.327** 117.506*** 120.075*** 119.806***
(20.165) (20.252) (82.636) (18.884) (23.754) (20.819)
Panel A: Development
Population density (1831) -0.034 0.027 0.010
(0.058) (0.036) (0.028)
log Urbanization (1831) -5.395 -9.979 2.072 -6.442
(10.712) (6.972) (14.205) (6.523)
× Religiosity (late 18th c.) -28.673
(32.130)
Panel B: Enlightenment
log 1 + SubEnc (1777-1779) -16.281*** -14.468*** -12.750 -13.698***
(6.086) (4.389) (11.103) (4.825)
× Religiosity (late 18th c.) -3.303
(21.491)
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 81 80 79 78 78 81 80 80 78
R-squared 0.48 0.72 0.48 0.73 0.73 0.53 0.76 0.76 0.76
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Appendix 5− Individual-level results
5.1 Baseline results
Figure 5.1.1: Treatment distribution with fixed effects
Note: This figure displays the distribution of Religiosity (late 18th c.) at the district of birth level, with and without fixed
effects. FE include period, département, département by period, male dummy in Panel A, plus a fertility sample dummy in
Panel B.
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Table 5.1.1: Determinants of fertility at the individual level (full sample)
Note: This table displays the results of the same regression as in Table 5, in the full sample. In all specifications, we include
a dummy = 1 for observations in the fertility sample.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: log Number of children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.152*** 0.141*** 0.145*** 0.149*** 0.187** 0.169* 0.113
(0.058) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.086) (0.101) (0.115)
× After transition 0.050
(0.149)
Sample
Observed after demographic transition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observed between 1700 and 1900 Yes
Controls
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religiosity (pre-secularization) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Development and Enlightenment Yes Yes Yes Yes
Département of birth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Département of birth by period fixed effects Yes Yes
Mean of log fert .73 .73 .73 .73 .73 .73 0
Standard deviation of log fert .81 .81 .81 .81 .81 .81 .83
Perc. 25-75 Religiosity (late 18th c.) .08 .07 .08 .08 .10 .09
Observations (couples) 14,984 14,699 14,699 14,611 14,611 14,611 20,922
Clusters (districts) 492 491 491 489 489 489 494
R-squared 0.12 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.38 0.39
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Figure 5.1.2: Determinants of fertility at the individual level: binscatter
Note: This figure displays the binscatter of specification (6) in Tables 5 and 5.1.1, partialled-out of the effect of all controls
and fixed effects. We use the Stata command binsreg (Cattaneo et al., 2019).
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Figure 5.1.3: Effect of Religiosity (late 18th c.) before and after transition: full sample
Note: This figure displays the estimated coefficients on Religiosity (late 18th c.) before and after the transition, from specification (7) of Table 5.1.1.
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5.2 Migrants and intergenerationally transmitted cultural traits
Table 5.2.1: Determinants of fertility at the individual level: migrants (fertility sample)
Note: This table displays the results of the individual-level regression of the log total number of children ever born on late eighteenth century religiosity. Re-
ligiosity (late 18th c.) is defined as the share of refractory clergy (non-jurors) in 1791, at the district of birth and marriage level. The migrant sample contains
all individuals who migrated between birth and marriage. Individual level controls include a quadratic in the age of marriage and in the log number of children
of the individual’s parents. Religiosity (pre-secularization) controls include the number of abbeys in 1756 and the duration of Jesuit presence until 1763 (both at
the district of marriage level). Development and Enlightenment controls include the urban status of the town of marriage in the year of observation and the log of
Encyclopedie subscriptions in 1777 − 1779 at the district of marriage level. All specifications include period fixed effects and a male dummy. We report two-way
clustered standard errors (at the couple and district of marriage level). Table 5.2.2 reports the same regressions for the full sample. Figure 5.2.1 displays the esti-
mated coefficient over time from specification (6).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: log Number of children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) of district of marriage 0.427*** 0.221*** 0.156* 0.167 0.387*
(0.129) (0.075) (0.088) (0.136) (0.221)
× Years elapsed since transition -0.003
(0.003)
Sample
After demographic transition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Migrants only Yes Yes Yes
Controls
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religiosity (pre-secularization) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Development and Enlightenment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Département of marriage fixed effects Yes
Département of marriage by period fixed effects Yes
District of birth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Corr. birth/marriage 0.91 0.91 0.43 0.43 0.43
Observations (couples) 8,002 7,340 1,261 1,261 1,261
Clusters (districts) 401 391 290 290 290
R-squared 0.40 0.28 0.20 0.40 0.40
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Table 5.2.2: Determinants of fertility at the individual level: migrants (full sample)
Note: This table displays the results of the same regression as in Table 5.2.1, in the full sample. In all specifications, we
include a dummy = 1 for observations in the fertility sample.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
dep var: log Number of children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Religiosity (late 18th c.) of district of marriage 0.167 0.125*** 0.119* 0.142** 0.293*
(0.106) (0.043) (0.067) (0.070) (0.158)
× Years elapsed since transition -0.002
(0.002)
Sample
After demographic transition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Migrants only Yes Yes Yes
Controls
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religiosity (pre-secularization) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Development and Enlightenment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Département of marriage fixed effects Yes
Département of marriage by period fixed effects Yes
District of birth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Corr. birth/marriage 0.90 0.90 0.38 0.38 0.38
Observations (couples) 11,766 10,815 2,193 2,193 2,193
Clusters (districts) 457 452 373 373 373
R-squared 0.42 0.33 0.21 0.35 0.35
Figure 5.2.1: Determinants of fertility at the individual level: migrants
Note: This figure displays the estimated coefficient in specification (6) of Table 5.2.1, that is the coefficient on Religiosity
(late 18th c.) of the district of marriage, abstracting from district of birth fixed effects (in the migrants sample).
(Panel A) Fertility sample (Panel B) Full sample
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Appendix 6− Roots of secularization
Table 6.0.1: Summary statistics at the diocese level
Note: All observations weighed by diocese population in 1793.
Mean St. dev. Minimum Maximum N
Religiosity (late 18th c.) 0.48 0.25 0.05 0.95 122
log 1 + Jansenists (1716-1725) 2.36 2.04 0.00 7.31 133
Average exposure to N clergymen (1791) 655.10 298.00 290.94 1,615.42 131
Centuries of Jesuit presence (bef. 1763) 1.15 0.76 0.00 2.02 133
Abbayes (1756) 2.19 2.29 0.00 12.00 133
log 1 + Encyclopedie sub. per 10,000 inhabitants (1777-1779) 0.87 0.82 0.00 3.57 133
Population (1793) 318,377.16 210,239.06 20,902.00 1,063,871.00 133
Urbanization (1793) 2.58 0.86 0.00 4.45 133
Figure 6.0.1: Dragonnades
Note: “The new missionaries” (1686), engraving by Engelmann. From: Musée Protestant, Geneva
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Figure 6.0.2: Maps
Note: This figure displays the spatial distribution of some variables of interest, at the diocese level.
(Panel A) Religiosity (late 18th c.) (Panel B) log 1 + Jansenists (1716-1725) (Panel C) Centuries of Jesuit presence (bef.
1763)
Figure 6.0.3: Marginal effect of log 1 + Jansenists
Note: This figure displays the marginal effect of log 1 + Jansenists on religiosity in the late 18th c. This is the same re-
gression as in specification (6) of Table 6, with log 1 + Jansenists interacted with centuries of Jesuit presence before 1763.
We display the effect with and without region fixed effects.
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